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Abrell: Just a Little Talk with Jesus: Reaching the Limits of the Legisla

Notes
JUST A LITTLE TALK WITH JESUS:
REACHING THE LIMITS OF THE LEGISLATIVE
PRAYER EXCEPTION
I. INTRODUCTION
Now let us have a little talk with Jesus
Let us tell Him about our troubles
He will hear our faintest cry
He will answer by and by
Now when you feel a little prayer wheel turning
And you know a little fire is burning
You will find a little talk with Jesus makes it right1
Thus on April 5, 2005, began the legal battle over prayer offered at
the opening of the Indiana House Legislative sessions.2 The Speaker of
the Indiana House of Representatives, Brian Bosma, was keenly aware of
objections to the overtly Christian content of the prayers invoked each
meeting day at the opening of the House legislative sessions.3 He
nonetheless invited Reverend Brown, who had delivered the opening
prayer earlier that day, back into the Speaker’s stand to “bless us with a
song.”4 Reverend Brown proceeded to sing “Just a Little Talk with
Jesus” while several legislators, staff, and visitors stood, clapped, and
CLEVANT DERRICKS, Just a Little Talk with Jesus, http://www.preciouslordtakemyhand.
com/christianhymns/justalittletalk.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2007).
2
Hinrichs v. Bosma, 400 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1107 (S.D. Ind. 2005).
3
Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 8, Hinrichs v. Bosma, Nos. 05-4604, 05-4781 (7th Cir.
May 15, 2006) (he refuses “to actively or passively censor prayers by informing clergy and
members of the House that they cannot pray in accordance with the dictates of their
conscience.”).
4
Hinrichs, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 1103. The remaining lyrics of the song are as follows:
Sometimes my path seems dreary without a ray of cheer
And then the cloud about me hides the light of day
The mists in me rise and hide the stormy skies
But just a little talk with Jesus clears the way
...
I may have doubts and fears, my eyes be filled with tears
But Jesus is a freind [sic.] who watches day and night
I go to Him in prayer, He knows my every care
And just a little talk with Jesus makes it right
...
You will find a little talk with Jesus makes it right
Makes everything right
DERRICKS, supra note 1.
1
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sang along.5 Other members of the House walked out, offended by this
sectarian religious display during the legislative session.6 With such
objections apparently past the tipping point, a lawsuit ensued against the
Speaker, challenging the Christian nature of most of the prayers offered
during the last session.7
The first round of this battle over the legislative prayer content in the
Indiana House of Representatives ended in favor of the plaintiffs when
the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Indiana issued an
injunction requiring the Speaker to advise the persons offering prayer to
keep the content nonsectarian.8 However, Speaker Bosma refused to
carry out the court’s order, choosing to forego the usual opening prayer
rather than comply.9 He prefered allowing sectarian prayers, as in the
5
Hinrichs, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 1107. See also Eddie Baeb, Indiana’s Christians to Fight
Ruling, BUFFALO NEWS (New York), Dec. 15, 2005, at A9 (asserting that this song performed
by the Baptist church elder was the source of the subsequent lawsuit).
6
Hinrichs, 400 F. Supp. 2d. at 1107.
7
Id. at 1108. Like most Hoosiers, all four plaintiffs are Christians. Baeb, supra note 5
(“About 82 percent of Indiana identifies itself as Christian and less than 1 percent as Jewish
or Muslim, an Indiana University poll in 2004 showed.”).
8
Hinrichs, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 1131. See also Patricia Manson, Lawmaker Wants Relief for
Prayer, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Sept. 5, 2006, at 3. Explaining the order and the Speakers
reaction to it:
The injunction directed the speaker to tell anyone delivering such a
prayer that it must be nonsectarian and must not refer to Jesus Christ
or be used to proselytize or advance any other faith or belief.
Contending that the injunction required the censorship of Christian
invocations, Bosma halted the 188-year practice of opening House
sessions with a prayer.
Id. (internal quotes omitted).
9
See Mike Smith, Statehouse Prayer Offered – Unofficially, FORT WAYNE NEWS SENTINEL,
Jan. 5, 2006, at L1. To comply with the court order, without actually carrying out its
directive to advise those invited to deliver the prayer, the Speaker has, in essence, taken his
ball home rather than play by the rules. Id. At the start of the 2006 legislative session,
Bosma gathered several members of the House in the back of the chamber for an informal,
voluntary prayer session. Id. Representative Eric Turner offered the following prayer:
Father, we thank you for sending your son to be a model for our lives
. . . Help us to be Christlike in all that we do, in our interactions with
one another as we represent our constituents back home. As we walk
and talk, help us to be Christlike. Father, we just pray these things in
the name of our Lord and our Savior, Jesus Christ.
Id. Afterward, many members applauded. Id. The news report continues:
Bosma said that because the prayers preceded official business, were
said in the back of the chamber and were completely voluntary, they
complied with the court order. He said he still believes [the district
court]’s ruling tramples on free speech and plans to appeal it to the 7th
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. For now, he will continue the new
practice.
Id.
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2005 session, even though those were held to violate the First
Amendment’s Establishment Clause.10
The embattled Indiana Legislature is not alone. The Tangipahoa
Parish School Board is currently facing its third Establishment Clause
lawsuit in the past decade.11 For the past thirty years, the Board, which
meets twice a month at the Parish School System Central Offices, has
“We are a nation of laws, even laws that we disagree with,” Bosma said. Id. Speaker
Bosma seems confused about the nature of the speech in question: the voluntary prayers in
the back of the chamber that preceded the official business of the House were not state
invocations. Id. The legal director of Indiana’s ACLU, Kenneth Falk, who represents the
plaintiffs, said of the prayer, “I don’t see this as legislative prayer. This appears to be the
private prayers of legislators, which they certainly have a right to do.” Id. See also Manson,
supra note 8. Falk is again quoted on the difference between the prayers:
The prayers being delivered to initiate sessions of the Indiana House of
Representatives are delivered with the authorization of the speaker by
invited officiants to give the prayers as part of the official agenda of
the House of Representatives . . . These prayers represent government
speech subject to the establishment clause, not private speech
protected by the free speech and free exercise clauses of the First
Amendment.
Id.
10
Smith, supra note 9. Speaker Bosma was vocal about his discontent with the federal
judge’s ruling. Id. See also Cory Havens, Prayer Returns to House, SOUTH BEND TRIB., Jan. 9,
2007, at A1:
Speaker of the House B. Patrick Bauer, D-South Bend, began Monday’s
opening session of the Indiana House of Representatives for 2007 with
a prayer.
...
Before leading the House in prayer, Bauer explained that, while
awaiting the latest ruling in the suit, he would use a script he prepared
in consultation with the attorney general’s office to avoid violating the
court’s order.
...
He said it was important to return the prayer to the front of the
chamber.
Id. at A1, A6. The scripted nonsectarian prayer Bauer read was as follows:
Almighty God, we come before you today humbled by the magnitude
of the responsibilities of this office. May you help us to realize that
those who have been given the greatest responsibility need the greatest
guidance. We pray you will show us what is good, and what is
required of us. We pray for your insight, your compassion, and your
strength. Amen.
Id. at A1.
11
Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd. (Tangipahoa Parish I), No. Civ.A. 03-2870, 2005 WL
517341 (E.D. La. Feb. 24, 2005); Debra Lemoine, Judge Gets Arguments on School Board
Meeting Prayers, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Sept. 10, 2004, at 1. The School Board lost one of
the lawsuits concerning a policy which directed teachers to read a disclaimer to students
before teaching evolution. Lemoine, supra, at 1. The second lawsuit challenged lunchtime
prayer meetings held by ministers on school property and was settled. Id.
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opened each meeting with an invocation.12 The School Board asserts its
classification as a deliberative body permitted use of prayer by the same
exception to the Establishment Clause allowed for state and national
legislative bodies.13
Much like the Indiana controversy, the Federal District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana declared the School Board’s practice a
violation of the Establishment Clause.14 On appeal, however, the Fifth
Circuit panel split three ways, producing three separate opinions, each
with its unique analysis.15 Thus, the question of how a local government
body can expect any proffered prayers to be regarded in the Fifth Circuit
remains unanswered.16
Federal courts across the country are embroiled in disputes
involving the use of prayer to open sessions for deliberative legislative
and administrative bodies at all levels of government, local to national.17
This growing body of case law relies almost exclusively on a 1983
Supreme Court decision, Marsh v. Chambers, which addressed state
legislative prayer.18 This Note proposes a judicial doctrine which would
give clear guidance to judges regarding the use of prayer by deliberative
bodies. First, this Note provides the history of legislative prayer, the
Supreme Court’s decision creating a blanket exception permitting its use,

Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd. (Tangipahoa Parish II), 477 F.3d 188, 192 (5th Cir.
2006).
13
Id. at 202. See also Lemoine, supra note 11, at 1 (describing the organization and
effectiveness of the local conservative Christian churches and their members, forming the
Christian Community Network). The Network’s goal is “to promote Christian values in all
aspects of community life, not just public schools . . . .” Id. The Network succeeded in
electing local Christian leaders, including a minister, to the nine-member School Board. Id.
One School Board member denies pushing prayer on anyone, stating, “. . . We believe it is
our freedom of religion, not freedom from religion . . . .” Id. Notably, however, no prayers
from any other faiths have ever been offered at the meetings. Id.
14
Tangipahoa Parish I, 2005 WL 517341, at *11.
15
See Tangipahoa Parish II, 477 F.3d at 188.
16
See Laura Maggi, Board Prayer Improper, Judges Say But Nonsectarian One May Work,
NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, Dec. 17, 2006, at 1. The split decision “left open questions
that could lead either side to appeal or to ask for a hearing before the full 5th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals.” Id.
17
See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). See also infra Part II.A (discussing the
history of legislative prayer).
18
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 783. Contra Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369 (6th Cir.
1999) (holding that the school board’s practice of opening its meetings with a prayer is not
comparable to legislative prayer). This case is the singular exception involving deliberative
bodies. Contra North Carolina Civil Liberties Union Legal Found. v. Constangy, 947 F.2d
1145 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that a state court judge’s practice of beginning court sessions
with a prayer violated the Establishment Clause).
12
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and the evolution of lower court cases such prayer has generated.19
Second, this Note identifies the trend to test the limits of the Court’s
single legislative prayer holding, notes the ambiguities in its application,
and highlights the need for the exception to be readdressed.20 Third, this
Note proposes a judicial doctrine that provides clear limits for legislative
prayer by requiring the content to remain nonsectarian and forbidding
the blanket application to all levels of government.21 This simple,
proposed doctrine would save communities time and money currently
spent on these controversies, as well as avoid the attending divisiveness
such religious disagreements produce.
II. LEGISLATIVE PRAYER: ITS HISTORY, JURISPRUDENCE, AND CURRENT
STATUS
The unique balance that the First Amendment creates between the
Religion Clauses has resulted in an array of doctrines and tests that
apply to the many situations where church and state collide.22 When
government is the speaker and its speech includes prayer, three schools
of thought exist with regard to content and location: strict separation,
neutrality, and accommodation.23 The limited guidance regarding what
prayer content is acceptable by whom may cause confusion and,
perhaps, leave religious minorities unprotected.24 First, this Part offers a
history of legislative prayer from its beginning in the First Congress
through the Supreme Court’s sole decision on this subject.25 Second, this
Part discusses lower courts’ subsequent applications of the Supreme

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
21
See infra Part IV.
22
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 12.2.1 (2d
ed. 2002). The First Amendment begins: “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
23
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, at § 12.2.1. The theory of strict separation posits that
government should be entirely secular, with religion entirely a private aspect of society. Id.
at 1149. The theory of neutrality suggests that government remain neutral toward religion,
without favoring either religion over non-religion or one religion over others. Id. at 1151.
The accommodation theory interprets the Establishment Clause to forbid government from
literally establishing a church, coercing religious participation, or favoring one religion
over others. Id. at 1153. In addition, because government is the speaker, legislative prayer
poses no conflict with the Free Exercise clause, which protects an individual right, and the
question in all cases discussing legislative prayer turns on whether the government is
advancing religion or entangled with religion. Id. at § 12.2.6.
24
See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (describing how easy it is for the religious
majority to fail to notice the coercive effects of practices which reflect their own religious
traditions).
25
See infra Part II.A.
19
20
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Court’s holding.26 Finally, this Part explores two current conflicts
involving legislative prayer.27
A. History of Legislative Prayer
Legislative prayer has a long history in America.28 Just three days
after the First Congress authorized appointment of paid chaplains for the
House and Senate, it approved the Bill of Rights, including the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment which succinctly forbade
government establishment of religion.29 In deciding Religion Clause
cases, courts often consider the decisions and communications at the
time these constitutional provisions were adopted in an effort to
ascertain the Founders’ intent.30 Historians interpret the Founders’
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.
28
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 787 (1983). In 1774, the Continental Congress began
the tradition of opening sessions with a prayer. Id. After the Constitutional Convention,
the First Congress began the policy of selecting a chaplain for the opening prayer. Id.
29
Id. at 788 (“Clearly the men who wrote the First Amendment Religion Clauses did not
view paid legislative chaplains and opening prayers as a violation of that Amendment, for
the practice of opening sessions with prayer has continued without interruption ever since
that early session of Congress.”). But history is not without its dissenters. See NOAH
FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD 247 (2005) (“Madison himself understood that paying the
chaplains of the House and Senate out of public funds was a constitutional anomaly, and
he wisely suggested that the Congress ought to pay for their services from their own
pockets.”). As President, Madison recommended at least four days of national prayer and
thanksgiving and oversaw federal funding for both congressional and military chaplains
and missionaries charged with converting the Indians to Christianity. Patrick M. Garry,
Religious Freedom Deserves More Than Neutrality: The Constitutional Argument for
Nonpreferential Favoritism of Religion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1, 20 (2005).
30
DARIEN A. MCWHIRTER, THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 6 (1994). The
handling of church and state issues soon after the Bill of Rights was adopted into the
Constitution is also telling of what the authors had in mind. Id. Two of the Founders’
actions and words are most heavily relied upon: James Madison and Thomas Jefferson. Id.
at 4. Madison proposed the set of twelve amendments at the first session of the first
Congress, which were modified by the House and Senate and passed as the ten
amendments of the Bill of Rights. Id. Shortly following the Bill of Rights’ adoption,
Jefferson wrote what may be the most quoted statement concerning the meaning of the
religion clauses of the First Amendment:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between
man and his God; that he owes account to none other for his faith or
his worship; that the legislative powers of the government reach
actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence
that act of the whole American people which declared that their
legislature should “make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,” thus building a wall
of separation between church and State. Adhering to this expression
of the supreme will of the nation in behalf of the rights of conscience, I
shall see with sincere satisfaction the progress of those sentiments
26
27
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intent using available records, attempting to reconcile the contradiction
of the Establishment Clause with the paid chaplains.31 Federalism was
an important issue for the First Congress, and several states at the time
recognized and used taxes to support established churches.32 The
Fourteenth Amendment, which makes the Establishment Clause
applicable to the states, did not exist when the Bill of Rights was
originally approved.33 Thus, historical context, while limited in its
which tend to restore man to all of his natural rights, convinced he has
no natural right in opposition to his social duties.
Id. at 4. See also Kurt T. Lash, Power and the Subject of Religion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1069 (1998).
31
See, e.g., MICHAEL J. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS
OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 15-16 (1978). The author sums up the hopes of the Founders:
What should be emphasized here is the broad area of agreement
between Madison and the others in the First Congress. They all
wanted religion to flourish, but they all wanted a secular government.
They all thought a multiplicity of sects would help prevent domination
by any one sect. All of them also thought religion was useful, perhaps
even necessary, for teaching morality. They all thought a free republic
needed citizens who had a moral education. They all thought the
primary responsibility for this education lay with the states. And they
all agreed that Article I gave Congress no direct power to deal with the
subject. The disagreement was over what Congress should be allowed
to do pursuant to some other delegated power.
Id. at 17.
32
MARK DOUGLAS MCGARVIE, ONE NATION UNDER LAW: AMERICA’S EARLY NATIONAL
STRUGGLES TO SEPARATE CHURCH AND STATE 13 (2004).
33
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. But see Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678-79
(2002) (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas stated:
When rights are incorporated against the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment they should advance, not constrain,
individual liberty.
Consequently, in the context of the Establishment Clause, it may
well be that state action should be evaluated on different terms than
similar action by the Federal Government . . . Thus, while the Federal
Government may ‘make no law respecting an establishment of
religion,’ the States may pass laws that include or touch on religious
matters so long as these laws do not impede free exercise rights or any
other individual religious liberty interest. By considering the particular
religious liberty right alleged to be invaded by a State, federal courts
can strike a proper balance between the demands of the Fourteenth
Amendment on the one hand and the federalism prerogatives of States
on the other.
Id. Justice Thomas reiterates his position as to incorporation of the Establishment Clause
even more clearly in Elk Grove Village Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow two years later. 542 U.S.
1, 49 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citation omitted.), two years later. He stated:
I accept that the Free Exercise Clause, which clearly protects an
individual right, applies against the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment. . . But the Establishment Clause is another matter. The
text and history of the Establishment Clause strongly suggest that it is
a federalism provision intended to prevent Congress from interfering
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modern applicability, reveals that the Founding Fathers saw no real
threat to the Establishment Clause through the use of legislative prayer.34
Only once has the Supreme Court addressed this issue squarely,
recognizing a special exception to the usual Establishment Clause
doctrines for legislative prayer in Marsh v. Chambers.35 The Court
examined the Nebraska legislature’s 100-year-old practice of employing
a chaplain to open the daily legislative session with a prayer.36 The longwith state establishments. Thus, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, which
does protect an individual right, it makes little sense to incorporate the
Establishment Clause.
Id.
34
See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790-91. However, there have been colossal changes in the
country since the adoption of the First Amendment. See Sch. Dist. Of Abington Township,
Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 240 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[O]ur religious
composition makes us a vastly more diverse people than were our forefathers. They knew
differences chiefly among Protestant sects. Today the Nation is far more heterogeneous
religiously, including as it does substantial minorities not only of Catholics and Jews but as
well of those who worship according to no version of the Bible and those who worship no
God at all.”)
35
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 783. The Court chose not to apply other Establishment Clause
doctrines available at the time. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (establishing
the Lemon test in finding that state aid to nonpublic schools did not have a secular purpose,
a primary effect which neither advances nor inhibits religion, nor did it foster excessive
government entanglement with religion); see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984)
(O’Connor concurrence) (establishing the endorsement test analyzing a city’s display of a
nativity scene and finding that the city did not symbolically endorse a particular religion
through the display). Since the decision in Marsh, other possible doctrines have emerged.
See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (establishing
the neutrality test through the government’s similar treatment of religious and secular
groups); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (establishing the coercion test through the
finding that prayers at public school graduations are inherently coercive because there is
great pressure on students to attend their graduation ceremonies and to not leave during
the prayer).
36
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 784. Robert E. Palmer, a Presbyterian minister, served as the
chaplain since 1965, sixteen years before the time the case was heard by the Court, at a
salary of $319.75 per month for each month that the legislature was in session. Id. at 785.
The chaplain’s prayers included explicitly Christian references for the first fifteen years of
his tenure. Id. at 824 n.2 (Stevens dissent). An example of such prayer is the following,
given by Palmer on March 20, 1978:
Father in heaven, the suffering and death of your son brought life to
the whole world moving our hearts to praise your glory. The power of
the cross reveals your concern for the world and the wonder of Christ
crucified.
The days of his life-giving death and glorious resurrection are
approaching. This is the hour when he triumphed over Satan’s pride;
the time when we celebrate the great event of our redemption. We are
reminded of the price he paid when we pray with the Psalmist:
My God, my God, why have you forsaken me, far from my prayer,
from the words of my cry? O my God, I cry out by day, and you

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol42/iss1/6

Abrell: Just a Little Talk with Jesus: Reaching the Limits of the Legisla

2007]

Just a Little Talk with Jesus

153

term use of a single Christian minister was acceptable absent proof of
impermissible motive.37 Paying the chaplain from state funds did not
violate the Establishment Clause in view of the historical tradition of
paid legislative chaplains.38 The question concerning the content of the
prayers in the Judeo-Christian tradition, which becomes more relevant in
subsequent disputes, was not of concern because there was “no
indication that the prayer opportunity has been exploited to proselytize
or advance any one, or disparage any other, faith or belief.”39 Indeed,
the Court expressed a reluctance to dissect particular prayers in an effort
to assess their constitutionality.40

answer not; by night, and there is no relief for me. Yet you are
enthroned in the Holy Place, O glory of Israel? In you our fathers
trusted; they trusted, and you delivered them. To you they cried, and
they escaped; in you they trusted, and they were not put to shame.
But I am a worm, not a man; the scorn of men, despised by the people.
All who see me scoff at me; they mock me with parted lips, they wag
their heads: He relied on the Lord; let Him deliver him, let Him rescue
him, if He loves him. Amen.
Id. A previous complaint from a Jewish legislator in 1980 led Palmer to remove all
references to Christ. Id. at 793 n.14.
37
Id. at 793-94. No impermissible motive was found because Palmer’s reappointment
was related to the acceptability of his performance and personal qualities. Id. at 793. In
addition, guest chaplains substituted for Palmer during absences or at the request of
legislators. Id.
38
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794. More recently the Court has relied heavily on history and
tradition in deciding other Establishment Clause cases. In Van Orden v. Perry, Justice
Breyer’s swing vote held that a granite monument bearing the Ten Commandments on the
grounds of the Texas Statehouse could remain due to its almost fifty-year, unchallenged
residency in that location. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
But see McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (finding more recent placement of
Ten Commandments and attempting to add historical relevance to display fails to satisfy
reliance on history and tradition). These tandem cases concerning display of the Ten
Commandments reflect similar reasoning as was applied in Marsh to the long-term service
of the legislative chaplain with no impermissible motive discernable. Marsh, 463 U.S. at
793-94.
39
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794-95. Another relevant factor in legislative prayer cases was the
maturity of the audience. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring):
The saying of invocational prayers in legislative chambers, state or
federal, and the appointment of legislative chaplains, might well
represent no involvements of the kind prohibited by the Establishment
Clause. Legislators, federal and state, are mature adults who may
presumably absent themselves from such public and ceremonial
exercises without incurring any penalty, direct or indirect.
Id. at 299-300 (footnote omitted). Justice Brennan, however, had a change of heart
regarding legislative prayer twenty years later in Marsh. See generally Marsh, 463 U.S. at
795-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
40
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795.
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Members of the Court commented on the Marsh analysis and shed
more light on the evaluation of particular prayers used in legislative
settings in County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union.41 While
Allegheny dealt with the holiday display of a crèche in a county
courthouse, the display was analogized with the legislative prayer in
Marsh.42 The majority noted that although the Founding Fathers
authorized the use of legislative prayer at the time of the passage of the
Bill of Rights, such history “cannot legitimate practices that demonstrate
the government’s allegiance to a particular sect or creed.”43 This
E.g. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 662-63 (1989) (O’Connor, J.,
concurrence):
[I]n Marsh v. Chambers, we found that Nebraska’s practice of
employing a legislative chaplain did not violate the Establishment
Clause, because legislative prayer presents no more potential for
establishment than the provision of school transportation, beneficial
grants for higher education, or tax exemptions for religious
organizations. Noncoercive government action within the realm of
flexible accommodation or passive acknowledgment of existing
symbols does not violate the Establishment Clause unless it benefits
religion in a way more direct and more substantial than practices that
are accepted in our national heritage.
Id. (citation omitted).
42
Id. See also Lynch v. Donnelly, 464 U.S. 668 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring):
These features combine to make the government’s display of the
crèche in this particular physical setting no more an endorsement of
religion than such governmental “acknowledgments” of religion as
legislative prayers of the type approved of in Marsh, government
declaration of Thanksgiving as a public holiday, printing of “In God
We Trust” on coins, and opening court sessions with “God save the
United States and this honorable court.” Those government
acknowledgments of religion serve, in the only ways reasonably
possible in our culture, the legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing
public occasions, expressing confidence in the future, and encouraging
the recognition of what is worthy of appreciation in society. For that
reason, and because of their history and ubiquity, those practices are
not understood as conveying government approval of particular
religious beliefs.
Id. (citation omitted).
43
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 603. The Court continues:
Indeed, in Marsh itself, the Court recognized that not even the “unique
history” of legislative prayer can justify contemporary legislative
prayers that have the effect of affiliating the government with any one
specific faith or belief. The legislative prayers involved in Marsh did
not violate this principle because the particular chaplain had “removed
all references to Christ.” Thus, Marsh plainly does not stand for the
sweeping proposition . . . that all accepted practices 200 years old and
their equivalents are constitutional today. Nor can Marsh, given its
facts and its reasoning, compel the conclusion that the display of the
crèche involved in this lawsuit is constitutional . . . .
41
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discussion from Allegheny is usually considered in addition to the
holding from Marsh when courts evaluate the allowable content of
particular prayer in challenges to legislative prayer.44 An appraisal of
this fusion of Marsh and Allegheny, often followed by the lower courts,
concludes that while the government cannot align itself with a particular
faith, legislative bodies may provide an invocation before engaging in
public business.45 This summation of Marsh and Allegheny decisions will
be referred to throughout this Note as the Marsh/Allegheny doctrine.46
B. The Ensuing Evaluation of Legislative Prayer
The Supreme Court’s application of the Establishment Clause to
government prayer activities has two main branches – legislative prayer
and school prayer.47 While government prayer in public schools is
uniformly banned in primary and secondary schools, once a student
leaves his high school graduation ceremony, the only Establishment
Clause protection offered by the Court to address adult exposure to
government prayer is in the legislative prayer context.48 This Part

. . . The history of this Nation, it is perhaps sad to say, contains
numerous examples of official acts that endorsed Christianity
specifically . . . . Whatever else the Establishment Clause may mean . . .
, it certainly means at the very least that government may not
demonstrate a preference for one particular sect or creed (including a
preference for Christianity over other religions).
Id. at 603-05. (Internal cites omitted).
44
See, e.g., Hinrichs v. Bosma, 400 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1117 (S.D. Ind. 2005) (holding that
the emphasis of Christian doctrine, including the resurrection and divinity of Jesus of
Nazareth, overstepped the bounds of nonsectarian prayer allowed by Marsh).
45
Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 298 (4th Cir. 2004). Specifically, this court
noted that Marsh and Allegheny can be read together to:
. . . teach that, in view of our Nation’s long and unique history, a
legislative body generally may, without violating the Establishment
Clause, invoke Divine guidance for itself before engaging in its public
business. But Marsh and Allegheny also teach that a legislative body
cannot, consistent with the Establishment Clause, exploit this prayer
opportunity to affiliate the Government with one specific faith or belief
in preference to others.
Id. (internal quotes omitted).
46
See infra Parts II.B, III.
47
See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, at § 12.2.
48
See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983); see also Elizabeth B. Halligan, Note,
Coercing Adults?: The Fourth Circuit and the Acceptability of Religious Expression in Government
Settings, 57 S.C. L. REV. 923, 925 (2005-2006) (recognizing that the Supreme Court has
addressed various public school prayer cases but has only addressed adult prayer in the
legislative prayer setting). But see Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding
that supper prayer at the Virginia Military Institute violated the Establishment Clause due
to the coercive elements unique to the military college).
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elucidates the application of the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding
legislative prayer and other prayer in adult situations.49
1.

Marsh/Allegheny Applied: Limits on Content

Since Marsh and Allegheny, lower courts have attempted to define the
constitutionality of legislative prayer content. 50 The Tenth Circuit, for
example, examined a specific prayer to be given at the opening of a city
council meeting in Snyder v. Murray City Corporation.51 Ignoring the
See infra Parts II.B.1, II.B.2.
See infra Part II.B. The Marsh decision was announced after the D.C. Circuit heard oral
arguments in the case of Murray v. Buchanan, in which the payment of salaries and
expenses for Chaplains of the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate were challenged,
but was dismissed by the district court. Murray v. Buchanan, 720 F.2d. 689, 690 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (per curiam) (en banc). The D.C. Circuit dismissed the appeal. Id.
51
Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 1998). The plaintiff, unhappy
with the resumption of legislative prayers in Utah, drafted the following prayer proposal to
be given at a Murray City council meeting:
Our Mother, who art in heaven (if, indeed there is a heaven and if
there is a god that takes a woman’s form) hallowed be thy name, we
ask for thy blessing for and guidance of those that will participate in
this meeting and for those mortals that govern the state of Utah; We
fervently ask that you guide the leaders of this city, Salt Lake County
and the state of Utah so that they may see the wisdom of separating
church and state and so that they will never again perform demeaning
religious ceremonies as part of official government functions;
We pray that you prevent self-righteous politicians from misusing the name of God in conducting government meetings; and, that
you lead them away from the hypocritical and blasphemous deception
of the public, attempting to make the people believe that bureaucrats’
decisions and actions have thy stamp of approval if prayers are offered
at the beginning of government meetings;
We ask that you grant Utah’s leaders and politicians enough
courage and discernment to understand that religion is a private
matter between every individual and his or her deity; we beseech thee
to educate government leaders that religious beliefs should not be
broadcast and revealed for the purpose of impressing others; we pray
that you strike down those that mis-use your name and those that
cheapen the institution of prayer by using it for their own selfish
political gains;
We ask that the people of the state of Utah will some day learn
the wisdom of the separation of church and state; we ask that you will
teach the people of Utah that government should not participate in
religion; we pray that you smite those government officials that would
attempt to censor or control prayers made by anyone to you or to any
other of our gods;
We ask that you deliver us from the evil of forced religious
worship now sought to be imposed upon the people of the state of
Utah by the actions of mis-guided, weak and stupid politicians, who
abuse power in their own self-righteousness;
49
50
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motive of the prayer-giver, whose goal was to completely thwart all city
government prayer, the court applied the Marsh/Allegheny analysis.52 As
such, the prayer was rejected because the content of the prayer both
proselytized for a specific brand of religion and disparaged other
divergent religious views.53
The Ninth Circuit succinctly held that allowing prayers “in the name
of Jesus” at school board meetings violated the Establishment Clause, in
Bacus v. Palo Verde Unified School District Board of Education.54 The
references to Christ advanced a single faith.55 While not disparaging
All this we ask in thy name and in the name of thy son (if in fact
you had a son that visited Earth) for the eternal betterment of all of us
who populate the great state of Utah. Amen.
Id. at 1229 n.3. The Tenth Circuit pondered whether this was religious speech or “political
harangue[:]”
Although Snyder’s putative prayer is unusual and iconoclastic,
because this case was decided on summary judgment we will assume
without deciding that it is an invocational prayer . . . .
[T]he
Establishment Clause speaks only to the religious aspect of Snyder’s
prayer, which we presume for purposes of this appeal, and as a result,
we are not called in this case to evaluate the prayer’s political
overtones. By assuming the religious content of Snyder’s prayer, we
expressly reserve for another day the very difficult issue of attempting
to discern the line between prayer and secular speech masquerading as
prayer.
Id. at 1228-29.
52
Id. at 1232-36. The Tenth Circuit opinion discusses Marsh’s acceptance of prayers
offered within a tolerable range of common beliefs and selection of the person reciting the
prayer. Id. at 1233-34. Snyder’s prayer fails in both comparisons. Id. at 1236.
53
Id. at 1236. The court stated that “Snyder’s claim must fail as a matter of law because
his proposed prayer falls well outside the genre of legislative prayers that the Supreme
Court approved in Marsh” and his prayer “aggressively proselytizes for his particular
religious views and strongly disparages other religious views[,]”. . . “clearly draws on the
tenets of his belief . . . that prayer should only be conducted in private[,]”. . . “seeks to
convert his audience to his belief in the sacrilegious nature of governmental prayer[,]” all of
which make the prayer proselytizing and outside the allowable boundaries of Marsh
analysis. Id. at 1235.
54
52 F. App’x 355 (9th Cir. 2002). The opinion is precise and concise in its rejection of
the board meeting prayers and contains a memorandum deeming it inappropriate for
publication or citing to by the courts of the circuit. Id. at 356. Despite this, the case has
been cited to in subsequent legislative prayer decisions. E.g., Hinrichs v. Bosma, 400 F.
Supp. 2d 1103 (S.D. Ind. 2005); Pelphrey v. Cobb County, Ga., 410 F. Supp. 2d. 1324, 1335
(2006).
55
Bacus, 52 F. App’x at 356. The court sidesteps the issue of whether the particular
prayer in question here at a school board meeting is more like legislative prayer or prayers
in school rooms. Id. However, the opinion states that if it were school prayer, then
“plainly these regular prayers ‘in the Name of Jesus’ would be unconstitutional,” and
proceeds to apply the Marsh analysis. Id. at 356-57. But see Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of
Educ., 171 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that prayer at a school board meeting is
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other faiths or proselytizing, the prayers “advanced one faith,
Christianity, providing it with a special endorsed and privileged status
in the school board.”56
The Fourth Circuit recently addressed legislative prayer in Wynne v.
Town of Great Falls, South Carolina.57 In Wynne, a regular attendee of the
town council meetings objected to references to Jesus Christ and asked
the council, on more than one occasion, to use an alternative prayer with
limited references to “God.”58 By applying the Marsh/Allegheny analysis,
analogous to the school prayer cases and following that line of precedent, as opposed to the
Marsh analysis, because the school board meetings were “conducted on school property by
school officials, and are attended by students who actively and regularly participate in the
discussions of school-related matters . . . [T]he logic behind the school prayer line of cases is
more applicable to the school board’s meetings than is the logic behind the legislativeprayer exception in Marsh.”). Id. at 381.
56
Bacus, 52 F. App’x at 357. The court continues to explain that because the plaintiffs
here were seeking to participate in their political community, their standing to bring suit
was satisfied. Id. The plaintiffs were teachers in the community who certainly had reason
to attend the school board meetings. Id. at 356. Because the prayers were unconstitutional,
the teachers demonstrated standing through their injury in fact, the affront at each meeting,
which was traceable to the challenged conduct, the opening prayer. Id.
57
Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, South Carolina, 376 F.3d 292, 295 (4th Cir. 2004). The
Fourth Circuit also addressed legislative prayer in Simpson v. Chesterfield County Board of
Supervisors. 404 F.3d 276, 279 (4th Cir. 2005). Curiously, both of these Fourth Circuit cases
were brought by Wiccans. Wynne, 376 F.3d at 295; Simpson, 404 F.3d at 279. Wicca is based
on a pagan religion, but has evolved in the United States into what is best described as
modern feminine witchcraft. BELIEF BEYOND BOUNDARIES: WICCA, CELTIC SPIRITUALITY
AND THE NEW AGE 44-45, 137 (Joanne Pearson ed., The Open University 2002). Simpson
challenged her exclusion from the list of religious leaders providing nonsectarian
invocations prior to the public sessions of the county board of supervisors. Simpson, 404
F.3d at 279-80. Here, the content of the prayer was not an issue per se, rather the selection
process for the prayer-givers was challenged. Id. at 284. Therefore, further discussion of
this case is not included in this note because the content issue is not implicated.
Interestingly, Wicca is non-proselytizing, a tradition grown from the history of witch hunts,
and thus, also involves a great deal of secrecy, intimacy, and a high level of trust among its
members. BELIEF BEYOND BOUNDARIES, supra, at 136. While it may seem an anomaly to
have two recent federal appellate level prayer cases brought by Wiccans, perhaps the
Wiccan dissatisfaction with legislative prayer should be viewed as originating in a similar
manner as other nontraditional minority religions in constitutional case history. See, e.g.,
Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150
(2002); Lovell v. City of Griffin, Georgia, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (discussing freedom of
expression suits brought by Jehovah’s Witnesses); U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982)
(discussing Free Exercise Clause suits brought Amish litigants); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972) (same).
58
Wynne, 376 F.3d at 295. Not only did the mayor refuse to change the content of the
opening prayer, but subsequently several Christian ministers drafted resolutions and
petitions supporting the continuance of the prayer practice which referred to Wynne as a
“professed ‘witch.’” Id. When Wynne declined to stand during the prayer, she was
chastised and threatened. Id. When she attempted to avoid the controversy by arriving at
the meeting after the prayer was invoked, she was denied the right to speak at the meeting
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the court determined that the practice “clearly advance[d] one faith,
Christianity, in preference to others.”59 The public officials were held
free to continue the invocations prior to the town council meetings but
not to advance a single religious view.60
Likewise, in Rubin v. City of Burbank, a California appellate court
followed this line of analysis in holding that a city council’s intermittent
invocation of the name of Jesus Christ violated the Establishment
Clause.61 The court interpreted Marsh/Allegheny “to mean that any
legislative prayer that proselytizes or advances one religious belief or
faith, or disparages any other, violates the Establishment Clause.”62
Most courts adhere to the Marsh/Allegheny analysis when evaluating
prayers in city and county government meetings across the United
States.63 The decisions applying Marsh/Allegheny predictably held that
legislative prayer across the board is constitutionally acceptable, while
sectarian content, even just invoking Jesus Christ, is unconstitutional.
Recently, however, some courts have chosen to ignore this distinction.64

because the opportunity to sign up on the agenda was only offered before the prayer. Id.
Wiccan beliefs predate Christianity. Robyn Monaghan, Wiccans Dispel Stereotypes, THE
TIMES, Oct. 31, 2006, at A7. The Wiccan philosophy has no concept of “ultimate evil” and
does not include a belief in, and therefore couldn’t worship, Satan. Id. at A1. Wiccans also
do not practice any form of animal sacrifice; they are, in fact, animal lovers, often
vegetarians. Id.
59
Wynne, 376 F.3d at 301 (internal citations omitted). The Town Council argued that it
was not “advancing” Christianity in its single invocation at each meeting, in that it was not
trying to convert any attendees of other faiths. Id. at 300. However, the court refused to
give the same meaning to the words “proselytize” and “advance” from Marsh, and held
that the prayers here “embody the precise kind of advancement of one particular religion
that Marsh cautioned against.” Id. at 302 (internal quotes omitted); cf. Snyder v. Murray
City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227, 1234 n.10 (10th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (noting that “all prayers
‘advance’ a particular faith or belief in one way or another” and, therefore, only the “more
aggressive form of advancement, i.e., proselytization” may be prohibited). The Wynne
court rejects this interpretation of “proselytize or advance” from Marsh, because
“nonsectarian prayers, by definition, do not advance a particular sect or faith.” Wynne, 376
F.3d at 301 n.6.
60
Wynne, 376 F.3d at 302. This phrasing mirrors the Lemon test language, whereby
government’s “principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion.” Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236, 243 (1968)).
61
Rubin v. City of Burbank, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 873.
62
Id.
63
See Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 410 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (N.D. Ga. 2006); Rubin v. City of
Burbank, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 867 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
64
See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change:
From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 515-16
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In Pelphrey v. Cobb County, Georgia, a Federal District Court ruled that
prayers at County Commission meetings which include explicit
references to the Christian faith were not proselytization or favoritism.65
While the actual prayer content involved in Pelphrey was analogous to
(2006). Discussing the Rehnquist Court and its current ramifications, religion is
highlighted as an element of the “deeper agenda of the Bush Administration[:]”
. . . [W]e believe that the Bush Administration’s commitment to
changing the constitutional boundaries between church and state is
especially important. Moreover, previous Republican appointments
have already borne considerable fruit. The changes in constitutional
doctrines involving religion have come closer than any others in the
last fifteen years to deserving the name “revolutionary.”
There has been a distinct and genuine move from the Warren and early
Burger Court’s general hostility to government support of religion to a
new theory of “neutrality” . . . . The Court now places relatively few
barriers in the way of state or federal funds goint to religious schools
or other religious organizations so long as the purpose is not a naked
preference for religious versus secular organizations. Some advocates
believed – some with horror, some with joy – that this portended a full
180 degree turn, in which the Supreme Court would define
“neutrality” as requiring support for religious education so long as
nonreligious education received support. . . .
. . . [I]t is impossible to estimate the shelf life of the Court’s twin – and
many would say incoherent – decisions in McCreary County v. ACLU
and Van Orden v. Perry regarding government-supported displays of
religion in the public square. In these two cases, the Court struck
down a publicly supported display of the Ten Commandments in
Kentucky, but upheld one in Texas. Justice Kennedy was a dissent in
McCreary County, and in the plurality in Van Orden. Given that he is
the new swing Justice, this means that Van Orden, which gave local
governments far greater leeway to place religious iconography in
public places, probably represents the wave of the future.
Id.
65
Pelphrey, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 1324. The record from Pelphrey lacks specific details
concerning who offers the prayers at the County Commission meetings and the exact
content of the prayers, but the district court seemed unconcerned about such particulars
because the prayers “typically last less than one minute.” Id. at 1325. The decision
describes the complainants’ focus as follows:
Plaintiffs, focusing on meetings that took place during an eighteen
month period prior to commencement of this lawsuit, have identified
thirty prayers including references to “Jesus,” “Christ,” or “Jesus
Christ” given at County Commission meetings, and point to twelve
such references during Planning Commission meetings. Typically,
these references were made at the conclusion of the prayer, and
consisted of language such as, “in Christ’s name” or “in Jesus’ name
we pray.”
Id. at 1326. The decision explains in a footnote that “assuming the eighteen month period
selected by Plaintiffs presents a fairly representative sample, it would appear that a
reference to Christ is made during approximately 75% of the invocations offered in the
meetings of the County Commissions.” Id. at 1326 n.3. The decision also notes that not all
of the references to Christ were “isolated or laconic.” Id. at 1326 n.4.
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the previous decisions disallowing overtly Christian content, the district
court in Pelphrey departed from the holdings of the Fourth, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits.66 The lack of both “impermissible motive” to show a
preference for Christianity and exploitation of the opportunity to
proselytize convinced the court that no violation occurred.67 In this twist
on the standard Marsh/Allegheny analysis, the court strictly followed the
Marsh edict of declining to parse the prayers in its review and focused
instead on the “cumulative effect of the legislative prayer practice, rather
than on the speech constituting an individual prayer.”68 Noting the
national rise of the Christian Conservative movement and the recent
accommodation of religion in the context of government displays and
school vouchers, Pelphrey introduces a similar policy shift in the
allowable content of legislative prayer.69

66
Id. at 1338. The court of the Northern District of Georgia specifically declines to follow
the interpretation and application of Marsh from several of the cases examined above:
After carefully considering the matter, the Court cannot accept the
latter courts’ reading of Marsh and its progeny. Such a per se
proscription on any reference to a deity acknowledged by one faith, or
any belief unique to that faith, would force courts into precisely the
position the Supreme Court cautioned against in Marsh . . . requiring
them to assume the role of regulators and censors of legislative prayer.
Id. at 1339.
67
Id. at 1348. The district court asserts:
[T]here is insufficient evidence before the Court to suggest an effort by
the Cobb County Commissions to exploit the legislative prayer
opportunity to proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any
other, faith or belief. The prayers at issue did not invariably contain
sectarian Christian references, and indeed, were on a number of
occasions given by non-Christian . . . clergy . . . Further, while the
percentage of prayers that included some reference to “Jesus” or
“Christ,” in the subset selected by Plaintiffs, is indeed substantial, this
Court is disinclined . . . to condemn a practice of legislative prayer
based on numbers alone.
Id. at 1346-47 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
68
Id. at 1338. Cf. Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, South Carolina, 376 F.3d 292 (4th Cir.
2004) (holding that plaintiff’s request to limit prayer references to “God” reasonable, and
references to “Jesus Christ” advance a particular religion).
69
See, e.g., NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD 199-219 (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2005).
Since the Marsh decision, there has been a rising of values-based evangelicalism, beginning
with the Christian Conservative movement which successfully pressed for the re-election
of Ronald Reagan in 1984 to ensure control over the changing Supreme Court. Id. at 199200. At this time, recent legal history demonstrated protection of religious minorities, like
Jews and Jehovah’s Witnesses, from the religious will of the majority. Id. at 206. In a
tactical response, the Christian evangelicals began depicting themselves as the minorities,
refused equal treatment and protection by their government. Id. Their strategy has been
successful, especially in areas involving economics. Id. at 216. But the evangelicals have
not yet been as successful in the courts, losing hard-fought clashes over public displays of
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Alternatives to the

Cases regarding adult-environment prayer are unique, but are
consistently evaluated like the other branch of government prayer cases,
those involving school prayer.70 The first adult prayer case, Tanford v.
Brand,71 involved a challenge to the invocation and benediction practice
during the Indiana University commencement ceremony.72
The
plaintiffs argued that they felt coerced to attend the ceremony, during
which the government sponsored prayer was thrust upon them against
religion, creationism, and prayer in schools. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992)
(holding that a nondenominational prayer at a school graduation violates the Constitution);
see also County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (holding that the display of a creche and
menorah violates the Establishment Clause); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987)
(holding that the teaching of “creation science” is an unconstitutional attempt to teach
religion in schools). But see Van Orden, v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005) (holding that granite
display of the Ten Commandments on the Texas Statehouse grounds is constitutional);
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (holding that government provision of
school tuition vouchers to be used at religious schools is constitutional).
70
See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text. See generally Deanna N. Pihos, Assuming
Maturity Matters: The Limited Reach of the Establishment Clause at Public Universities, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 1349 (2005); Henry J. Reske, And May God Bless, 78 A.B.A. J. 46 (Feb. 1992)
(discussing the subtle coercion of Lee v. Weisman). In school prayer/adult prayer cases, the
test in Lemon with coercion is most often applied. The endorsement test requires that the
government minimize the extent to which it encourages or discourages religious belief or
disbelief, practice or non-practice, observance or nonobservance. See Lynch v. Donnelly,
464 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (“Every Government practice must be judged in its unique
circumstances to determine whether it constitutes an endorsement or disapproval of
religion.”); Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward
Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1001 (1990). The neutrality test dictates that the
government acts with neutrality when, following neutral criteria and evenhanded policies,
it “extends benefits to recipients whose ideologies and viewpoints, including religious
ones, are broad and diverse.” Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 839
(1995). See generally Patrick M. Garry, Religious Freedom Deserves More Than Neutrality: The
Constitutional Argument for Nonpreferential Favoritism of Religion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2005)
(discussing the Supreme Court’s acceptance of the neutrality doctrine, especially in grants
of aid to education); Arnold H. Loewy, The Positive Reality and Normative Virtues of a
“Neutral” Establishment Clause, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 533 (2003) (discussing and encouraging
neutrality jurisprudence). But see E. Gregory Wallace, When Government Speaks Religiously,
21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1183, 1187-1202 (1994) (discussing the “myth” of neutrality in
government speech). Due to its particular applicability to funding programs, the neutrality
test has not been applied to legislative prayer cases. See Hinrichs, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 1115
n.11. While tax dollars are spent on legislative prayer in most state legislature cases, either
on the chaplain’s salary or the process of inviting and thanking visiting prayer-givers, the
test is not applicable in the way it was developed in Rosenberger. Id.
71
Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d 982 (7th Cir. 1997).
72
Id. A law professor, two law students, and an undergraduate student at Indiana
University brought suit to enjoin the prayers. Id. Indiana University’s practice of having
an invocation and benediction at its commencements was a 155 year tradition. Id. at 986.
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their will.73 The prayer offered at the ceremony was non-sectarian in
nature, and accommodations were offered to make exit and re-entry “an
easy matter” for those wishing to avoid the prayer entirely.74 While
prayer at middle school and high school graduations is unconstitutional,
the court determined that the students attending the University are
older, less impressionable, and could avoid the prayer altogether if
desired.75
Chaudhuri v. State of Tennessee followed Tanford, expanding on its
groundwork.76 Dr. Chaudhuri, a practicing Hindu, challenged the
University’s use of prayer and moments of silence at a variety of school
functions.77 The Sixth Circuit followed similar reasoning to the Tanford
decision, holding that attendance at the University events where prayer
was offered was not mandatory.78 While Chaudhuri argued that the
“university service” component of his professional evaluations was
affected by attendance and participation in University events, the court

Id. at 984-85.
Id. at 983-84. The prayer offered at the May 1995 benediction read as follows:
Let us pray. Gracious God we have gathered as dreamers. People
who believe deep inside that things can be better. We have been called
into being by you to make a difference. We like giving. Be with us as
we endeavor to reach out to those who feel distance from the joy and
the challenge of truth. We pray that we might touch with our learning
those who feel that there is no hope, no reason to believe in life and
love, and the possibility itself. Strengthen us for the journeys of mind,
of heart, of spirit, of body, so that we might be right in truth for one
another, and for our world. We ask this in the name of our common
god. Amen.
Id. at 983 n.1.
75
Id. at 985-86. The students could forego the ceremony altogether and receive their
diplomas through alternate means or they were free to exit and re-enter the ceremony at
will. Id. The law professor was under no obligation to attend the ceremony either and, like
the students, was free to come and go at will. Id.
76
Chaudhuri v. State of Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232 (6th Cir. 1997). The plaintiff was a
tenured professor at Tennessee State University who, over the years, lodged several
complaints against the University challenging prayer practice. Id. at 233-35. Plaintiff’s
complaints began as early as 1988, when his dissatisfaction with University prayer practice
compelled the University to adopt the use of non-sectarian prayers. Id. at 234. Dr.
Chaudhuri also filed suit for an alleged Civil Rights violation due to religious
discrimination. Id. at 234. The district court granted the school summary judgment. Id. at
234 n.1.
77
Id. at 233. Chaudhuri was not satisfied by the adoption of non-sectarian prayer
practice at the University because the prayers still strongly suggested a monotheistic
religious view. Id. at 236. He was also dissatisfied with the use of moments of silence
because he felt the intent was still to allow prayer. Id. at 233.
78
Id. at 238.
73
74
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found that his maturity and his freedom to refrain from both the events
and the prayers made him less vulnerable to religious indoctrination.79
The Sixth Circuit addressed adult prayer again by examining the
prayer practice at school board meetings in Coles v. Cleveland Board of
Education.80
The challenged prayer was initially held to be a
constitutionally permissible legislative prayer under Marsh due to the
“adult atmosphere” and the fact that the school board was an elected
body.81 However, the Sixth Circuit rejected both notions, deciding
instead that the board meetings were an “integral part of the public
school system” whose activities set it apart from the normal definition of
legislative bodies exempted by Marsh.82 The school board’s prayers
failed the Lemon test and were declared an unconstitutional government
prayer practice that endorsed Christianity.83
The final adult prayer case, in which the supper prayer practice at
the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) was challenged, is Mellen v.
Bunting.84 Like Tanford and Chaudhuri, Mellen involves prayer in a
college atmosphere.85 Referring often to the holdings of Tanford and
Chaudhuri, the court questioned the amount of coercion present in the

79
Id. at 239. One judge dissented as to the content of the prayers, compelling the bench
to be cautious and vigilant in protecting non-Christians from prayers offered often in our
nation with a strong Christian tradition. Id. at 240-41 (Jones, J., concurring and dissenting).
80
Mellen v. Bunting, 171 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1999). The prayers offered were clearly
sectarian, with repeated references to Jesus and the Bible, usually delivered by the school
board president, who was also a Christian minister. Id. at 385.
81
Coles v. Cleveland Board of Edu., 950 F. Supp. 1337, 1345-47 (N.D. Ohio 1996). See
generally Paul Ryneski, The Constitutionality of Praying at Government Events, 1996 DET. C.L.
REV. 603 (1996) (discussing prayer at a variety of events, from school graduation
ceremonies to city council meetings).
82
Coles, 171 F.3d at 381. The court notes that the “constituency” of the board includes
students, who cannot vote, and therefore have no say in who represents them at the board
meetings, and who, due to their age, are more likely to be influenced by the clearly
sectarian prayers offered. Id.
83
Id. at 386. Though the court refers to the possibility of coercion as in Lee, the Lemon
test was applied and the prayer practice failed all three prongs. Id. at 383-85. Cf Bacus v.
Palo Verde Unified School District Board of Education, 52 Fed.Appx. 355 (9th Cir. 2002)
(applying Marsh/Allegheny to hold similar school board prayer practice unconstitutional
due to its sectarian nature).
84
327 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2003).
85
Id. at 360. VMI is a state-operated military college funded by the Commonwealth of
Virginia which utilizes an adversarial method of training in its preparation of students for
military service and leadership. Id. at 361. Two former cadets sued to enjoin VMI from the
prayer practice and sought damages for the violation of the Establishment Clause. Id. at
360. Though the district court issued declaratory and injunctive relief, that judgment was
vacated because the cadets had already graduated from VMI. Id.
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university prayer situations.86 Unlike the practices at Indiana University
and Tennessee State University, the VMI system of education was found
to be “uniquely susceptible to coercion.”87 Many of the school’s training
methods involved conformity and highly encouraged participation in
mandatory and ritualized activities.88 Such pressure to attend statesponsored prayer events failed the Lemon test due to the coercive
environment and therefore failed to satisfy the Establishment Clause
prohibition.89
C. Two Cases Which Highlight the Limits of the Legislative Prayer Exception
Recent political trends have brought religion and government prayer
to the forefront of legal debate.90 Along with the recent Court’s

86
87

Id. at 371-72.
Id. at 371. The court explains:
Although VMI’s cadets are not children, in VMI’s educational system
they are uniquely susceptible to coercion. VMI’s adversative method
of education emphasizes the detailed regulation of conduct and the
indoctrination of a strict moral code . . . At VMI, even upperclassmen
must submit to mandatory and ritualized activities, as obedience and
conformity remain central tenets of the school’s educational
philosophy.

Id.
Id. at 372. Specifically referring to the dining service, the court explains:
The technical “voluntariness” of the supper prayer does not save it
from its constitutional infirmities. At all relevant times, VMI’s
upperclass cadets could avoid the mess hall in order to shield
themselves from the prayer. Nevertheless, the communal dining
experience, like other official activities, is undoubtedly experienced as
obligatory . . .
Put simply, VMI’s supper prayer exacts an
unconstitutional toll on the consciences of religious objectors.
Id. at 372.
89
Id. at 376-77. See generally Alexander A. Minard, But Could They Pray at UVA? The
Fourth Circuit’s Application of the Supreme Court’s School Prayer Jurisprudence to the Virginia
Military Institute’s Adult Cadets, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 997 (2005).
90
E.g. Neela Banerjee, Proposal on Military Chaplains and Prayer Holds Up Bill, THE N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2006, at A19 (discussing the delay in passing a bill that sets the Pentagon’s
spending levels due to a provision in the bill concerning the ability of military chaplains to
deliver sectarian prayers at nondenominational military events):
Chaplains can pray according to the traditions of their faith at worship
services, where attendance is voluntary. But they are also called upon
to offer prayers at mandatory functions, like changes of command,
banquets and speeches.
...
Opponents of the provision . . . say that at mandatory events, the
longstanding custom has been to offer a nonsectarian prayer, for
example, citing God, rather than Christ.
88
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inclination to accommodate religion by allowing displays of religious
symbols and permitting vouchers that support parochial school
education, there has been a private push to expand Christian doctrine
throughout American society.91 Hinrichs v. Bosma and Doe v. Tangipahoa
Parish School Board, the two cases described in the Introduction, reflect
this push.92
1.

Hinrichs v. Bosma:93
Marsh/Allegheny

Challenging the Content Allowed by

Indiana House Rule 10.2 calls for a prayer or invocation prior to
conducting business each meeting day.94 This practice is a long-standing
tradition, occurring on each meeting day for the past 188 years.95 The
The Defense Department, the main military chaplains association and
a variety of ecumenical groups have spoken against the provision,
saying that sectarian prayer would create division within the military.
“This provision could marginalize chaplains who, in exercising their
conscience, generate discomfort at mandatory formations,” the
Pentagon said in a written statement. “Such erosion of unit cohesion is
avoided by the military’s present insistence on inclusive prayer at
interfaith gatherings—something that the House legislation would
operate against.”
The provision is passionately supported, however, by many House
Republicans and evangelical Christian groups, like Focus on the
Family, who say that refusing chaplains, especially evangelicals, the
chance to pray in Jesus’ name infringes on their religious liberty.
Id. Considering the deference given to the military in the past, it may be safe to assume
that the Pentagon’s request to remain nonsectarian in the name of unity would be
supported by courts. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (rejecting a free
exercise challenge to the military denying an Orthodox Jewish doctor in the Air Force the
right to wear a yarmulke on duty, in an effort to foster unity).
91
See Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (holding that all school voucher programs will be
sustained as long as they can show free choice of schools by parents); Bowen v. Kendrick,
487 U.S. 589 (1988) (deeming constitutional the Adolescent Family Life Act, which provides
for receipt of family counseling grants to religious, as well as nonreligious, organizations,
but prohibits use of federal funds for family planning services, abortion counseling, or for
abortions).
92
See infra Parts II.C.1, II.C.2.
93
400 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (S.D. Ind. 2005).
94
Ind. H.R. R. 10.2 (simply listing “prayer” in the order of business of the House
Conduct of Business Part of the Rules of the House of Representatives). The order of
business is as follows: Calling the House to order, Prayer, Pledge of Allegiance, Roll call,
Reports from committees, Introduction of resolutions and bills, Business on the Speaker’s
table, and Reading of the Journal. Id. at 10.
95
The Speaker argues that there exists a long standing history and tradition of not just
legislative prayer, but Christian legislative prayer. See Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 30,
Hinrichs v. Bosma, Nos. 05-4604, 05-4781 (7th Cir. May 15, 2006) (“from America’s earliest
days to the present time, the prayers delivered by congressional chaplains have been true
sacral prayers, and many of them, true Christian prayers.”) (internal brackets omitted).
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prayer is offered from the Speaker’s stand, which, by House Rules, no
one may enter without the Speaker’s invitation.96 The invocation is
given by a variety of people, including religious clerics the
Representatives invite to be a “Minister of the Day” or by a
Representative when no cleric is present.97
Clerics are chosen through a nomination process by the
Representatives which involves completion of a simple form specifying
when the cleric is available, submission of the form to the Majority
Caucus Chair who schedules the cleric, and sending a confirmation letter
to the cleric.98 This letter includes a brief statement providing the cleric
some guidance in prayer composition, which, if enforced, would satisfy
the non-sectarian, non-proselytizing mandate of the Marsh/Allegheny
decisions.99 The extent of guidance given to the visiting clerics is
minimal, and no guidance at all is given to Representatives who provide
invocations.100
In 2005, the fifty-three opening prayers for the legislative session
were called into question.101 The vast majority of prayers offered in that
year were given by clerics identified with Christian churches.102 It is the
content of the prayers, however, that gave rise to claims of

96
Ind. H.R. R. 15 (“No person shall enter upon the Speaker’s stand or stand upon the
steps leading thereto without an invitation from the Speaker.”).
97
Hinrichs, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 1105.
98
Id. No clergyman nominated through the “Minister for a Day” process has ever been
turned down. See Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 2, Hinrichs v. Bosma, Nos. 05-4604, 054781 (7th Cir. May 15, 2006).
99
Hinrichs, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 1105. The letter states that “[t]he invocation is to be a short
prayer asking for guidance and help in the matters that come before the members. We ask
that you strive for an ecumenical prayer as our members, staff and constituents come from
different faith backgrounds.” Id.
100
Id. Following delivery of the invocation, no prayer-giver has ever been admonished,
corrected, or advised in any way about the religious content of the prayer that he or she
delivered. Id. at 1108.
101
Id. at 1108. At the time of trial:
Speaker Bosma was aware of the controversy and objections to the
sectarian content of most of the prayers offered in 2005. He planned to
continue the practice of invocations being delivered at the start of each
meeting day, and he did not expect to make any changes concerning
how invocations are given, who gives the invocations, or the character
of House oversight of the invocations’ content.
Id.
102
Id. Forty-one prayers were delivered by clergy from Christian churches; nine were
delivered by Representatives; one was delivered by a lay-person; one was delivered by a
Muslim imam; one was delivered by a Jewish rabbi. Id.
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unconstitutionality.103 The majority of prayers were explicitly Christian,
containing repeated reference to Jesus Christ, with some going so far as
to ask for conversion to Christianity.104 The April 2005 performance by
103
Id. at 1125-26. In contrast to the long-term chaplain of the Nebraska legislature in
Marsh, the Indiana House methods of prayer-giver selection are similar to methods deemed
acceptable in other post-Marsh cases, and the plaintiffs, in fact, find the methods
satisfactory and “do not seek to have the prayers eliminated altogether.” Id. at 1108.
Hinrichs specifically objected to the sectarian content of the prayers. Editorial, In Prayer, a
House Open to All, FORT WAYNE JOURNAL-GAZETTE (Indiana), Dec. 4, 2005, at A11.
[Hinrichs] said he had become troubled by tones reminiscent of
Indiana’s Ku Klux Klan past. Unlike previous sessions, when nonsectarian prayers called on lawmakers to provide leadership, the
prayers offered last spring suggested God was working through the
legislators. “When people think they are acting on behalf of Jesus
Christ, that’s when it gets scary,” Hinrichs said. “The Klan was a
Christian fraternal organization. The John Birch Society was a
Christian organization. The fact is, they were based in faith.”
Id.
104
Hinrichs, 400 F. Supp. 2d. at 1106-08. Of the fifty-three prayers given in the 2005
session, transcripts were available for forty-five prayers; of these, twenty-nine were
specifically offered with reference to Jesus Christ. Id. at 1106. Examples of the most
explicitly Christian include:
And for those who have lost family members in the current and
persistent conflicts of the world, we ask that You would tenderly
embrace them with the comfort of Your spirit, heal their pain in ways
that only You can, by showing them the love You expressed in the
sacrifice of Your Son Jesus Christ. Now God, cause Your face to shine
upon the men and women in this institution as they carry out Your call
on their lives and fulfill Your will for this land. While respecting those
within the sound of my voice who may adhere to a different faith, I
offer this prayer in the name of Jesus Christ, my Lord and Savior.
Id. at 1106-07 (quoting ending of opening prayer offered on March 22, 2005). Continuing:
Today on behalf of every man and woman under the sound of my
voice, every representative present in this house of government of the
great state of Indiana, I appeal to the God and Father of Jesus Christ,
the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, the God of the whole earth, that
He would find not only a welcome here, among those whom He has
honored to allow to sit in this place of authority, but also hearing ears
and perceptive and courageous hearts that would walk in the ways of
righteousness, govern in the way of justice, and make right choices. . . .
Let it be known today that it is required in leaders that a man be found
faithful. That integrity is a requirement of a leader, and that every
Representative is a leader before men and God. . . . As a minister of
the gospel, I exercise my right to declare this room a hallowed place. I
invite into this room, into the proceedings of the day, into the decisions
that will [be] made today, to each person, the mighty Holy Spirit of
God. Holy Spirit, give these here the mind of Christ . . . I ask this in
the name of Jesus Christ.
Id. at 1107-08 (quoting opening prayer from April 29, 2005). Also:
Lord we ask You that whatever we do, whatever we say, whatever we
write, we do it in Your glorious name. And now Lord we ask this in
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Reverend Brown prompted some House members to walk out, believing
that the sectarian nature of the song was inappropriate.105 Subsequently,
four plaintiffs brought suit against the Speaker challenging the use of
prayers that violate the mandate of Marsh.106
The federal district court held that the prayers violated the
Establishment Clause because of the emphasis on Christianity.107 The

Your Son’s name, who is Lord of Lords, King of Kings, Jesus Christ,
who gave us the most precious gift of all, to die on the cross for our
sins. Thank you Lord. Bless us all. We pray in Your name. Amen.
Id. at 1107 (citing 23 Jt. Ex. 16). These prayers are examples of the sectarian, proselytizing
prayers offered at the Indiana House of Representatives which clearly violate the spirit of
Marsh. Id. at 1107. “Whatever you do in word or deed, do all in the name of the Lord
Jesus, giving thanks through Him to God the Father.” Id. at 1106.
105
Hinrichs, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 1107. Reverend Brown’s invocation delivered earlier
included the following prayer:
Father we are so gracious [sic] to You for Your grace and mercy that
You have allowed us to be able to have and Father I thank You for our
Lord and Savior Jesus Christ, who died that we might have the right to
come together in love. Father, let us love one another as he has loved
us . . . I thank You in Jesus Christ’s name. Amen.
Id.
106
Id. at 1108. The four plaintiffs are all taxpayers who have standing as Indiana
taxpayers who object to their taxes being used to support the current legislative prayer
practices. Id. All four are members of Christian religions: Anthony Hinrichs is a member
of the Society of Friends, Reverend Henry Gerner is a retired minister of the United
Methodist Church, and Francis White Quigley and Lynette Herold are members of the
Roman Catholic Church. Id. at 1109. Just how many Americans share the plaintiffs’
opinion is a mystery. See Editorial, Prayer in the House, FORT WAYNE NEWS SENTINEL, Sept.
8, 2006, at A8. In reference to a recent poll conducted by the Pew Research Center for
People & the Press and the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, the editorial presents the
public opinion quandary:
Nearly half of Americans (49 percent) believe conservative Christians
have gone too far in trying to impose their religious values on the
country, according to the survey. At the same time, 69 percent think
liberals have gone too far in trying to keep religion out of schools and
government.
Id. Hinrichs has since lost his employment position due to his opposition to the legislative
prayer practice. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 12, Hinrichs v. Bosma, Nos. 05-4604, 05-4781
(7th Cir. May 15, 2006).
107
Hinrichs, 400 F. Supp. 2d. at 1131. In reaching this conclusion, the court also held that
the plaintiffs, as taxpayers, had standing to sue and that the prayers in question were
government speech. Id. at 1114. In subsequent briefs, Speaker Bosma has contested the
plaintiffs’ taxpayer standing:
Plaintiffs stipulated that when a member prays, the House incurs no
expenses for the invocation other than the normal expenses associated
with operating the House. That stipulation is fatal to any assertion of a
direct dollars-and-cents injury based on an appropriation or
disbursement of public funds occasioned solely by the activities
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court made a painstaking and thorough analysis using Marsh, while also
explaining its decision to avoid the other Establishment Clause tests.108
The Great Falls, Chesterfield County, Palo Verde, and Burbank opinions were

complained of. At a bare minimum, then, this Court must vacate the
injunction insofar as it relates to House members . . .
Even as to the ministers’ prayers, plaintiffs offer no convincing rebuttal
to our arguments . . . In contrast to Marsh, where the legislature had
appropriated funds for the chaplain’s salary, the outlays here—which
plaintiffs concede are a trifle—are for items that ordinarily are
provided as constituent services.
Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 3-4, Hinrichs v. Bosma, Nos. 05-4604, 05-4781 (7th
Cir. July 5, 2006) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
The Speaker also claims that plaintiffs lack standing for prudential reasons. Id. at 6-10.
In contesting that the prayers from the Speaker qualify as government speech, the Speaker
argues:
The issue, then, is whether the House controls the content of the
prayers, and the record is crystal clear on that point. As the district
court found, no cleric or Representative has ever been admonished,
corrected, or advised in any way about the religious content of the
prayer that he or she delivered. Indeed, the premise of plaintiffs’ case
is that the Speaker exercises insufficient control over the prayers.
Even the invocations of House members are not fairly attributable to
the state. Plaintiffs say that prayer is part of the official agenda of the
House, but in fact House Rule 10.2 requires that the invocation be
given before the opening of official business. Moreover, the Supreme
Court has recognized that public officials’ speech is the government’s
only when they speak pursuant to their official duties. Legislators
frequently make personal comments on the House floor, and not every
remark they make is pursuant to their official duties. This is especially
true of prayers, which are unrelated to legislation, require no quorum
or vote, and are unlikely to reflect the views of all members.
Id. at 13-14 (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis in original).
108
Hinrichs, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 1115-22. The court stated its intent and belief in
application of Marsh as the standard:
In Marsh v. Chambers, the Supreme Court recognized a special
exception to the usual Establishment Clause doctrines and permitted
the practice of having a paid legislative chaplain offer invocations in a
state legislature. Marsh v. Chambers establishes the principles and
boundaries that guide this court’s consideration of the Indiana House
prayer practices.
Id. at 1115 (internal citations omitted). The court notes possible use of other tests:
The practice of any form of legislative prayer would probably not
survive scrutiny under the most common Establishment Clause tests,
the Lemon test . . . , the endorsement test . . . , or the neutrality test. The
practice might survive the coercion test, though judges must keep in
mind that it may be easy for members of a religious majority to
overlook coercive effects of official practices that favor their own
religious traditions.
Id. at 1115 n.11.
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cited as consistent expressions of the Marsh doctrine.109 In his defense,
the Speaker argued that the history and tradition of expressly Christian
legislative prayers buttressed his practice.110 In addition, he argued that
all prayers are sectarian, encouraging an all-or-nothing approach to
legislative prayer in the hopes that the long history of prayer would
garner the blanket exception for even sectarian prayers.111 Finally, the
Speaker argued that the method used to choose the prayer-givers leaves
open the possibility for all religions to participate, and he would be
loathe to infringe upon their right to free speech.112 The court rejected
these arguments and issued a permanent injunction against the Speaker
to bar him from permitting sectarian prayer during the official
proceedings of the Indiana House of Representatives.113
The Speaker moved to stay the injunction pending appeal, but the
district court immediately denied the stay.114 The Seventh Circuit also
denied the stay shortly thereafter, holding that the Speaker was unable
to meet his burden to show a significant probability of success on the

Id. at 1121-22. Pelphrey was decided over a month after the district court decided
Hinrichs, thus there were no inconsistent opinions applying Marsh to legislative prayer
regarding the prayer content at the time of this decision. See generally Pelphrey, 410 F. Supp.
2d 1324 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
110
Hinrichs, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 1122. See also Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 1, Hinrichs
v. Bosma, Nos. 05-4604, 05-4781 (7th Cir. May 15, 2006) (“[T]he issue here is whether Marsh
invalidates sectarian legislative prayers—in particular, those referring to Jesus Christ—
despite the uncontroverted historical evidence that American legislative prayers have
always included such references, and despite the entanglements of religion and
government that would result if civil courts were required to parse prayers to distinguish
sectarian from nonsectarian invocations.”) (internal quotations omitted).
111
Hinrichs, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 1123-25. However, this argument has been raised
previously and dismissed because the secular purposes served by legislative prayer can be
fulfilled by other means. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 797-98 (Brennan, J., dissenting):
That the ‘purpose’ of legislative prayer is pre-eminently religious
rather than secular seems to me to be self-evident. ‘To invoke Divine
guidance on a public body entrusted with making the laws,’ is nothing
but a religious act. Moreover, whatever secular functions legislative
prayer might play—formally opening the legislative session, getting
the members of the body to quiet down, and imbuing them with a
sense of seriousness and high purpose—could so plainly be performed
in a purely nonreligious fashion that to claim a secular purpose for the
prayer is an insult to the perfectly honorable individuals who
instituted and continue the practice.
Id. (citation omitted).
112
Hinrichs, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 1128.
113
Id. at 1131.
114
Hinrichs v. Bosma, 410 F. Supp. 2d 745 (S.D. Ind. 2006).
109
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merits or irreparable harm absent a stay.115 While awaiting appeal, the
case has drawn considerable notice, as revealed by the eleven amicus
briefs filed.116 Oral arguments became a media event, and speculation
abounded concerning the decision and any further appeal.117
Meanwhile, legislators supporting the House’s prayer practice have
reacted to the district court holding.118 In the Indiana House of
Representatives, the members have overwhelmingly resolved to support
the Speaker in his quest to broaden the Supreme Court’s parameters of
prayer content.119 In Congress, a Representative from Indiana has
115
Hinrichs v. Bosma, 440 F.3d 393 (7th Cir. 2006). Though the opinion was a stay
motion opinion, it discussed the merits of the case in rather extensive detail and has been
cited in subsequent opinions regarding the topic of legislative prayer. E.g. Tangipahoa
Parish II, 477 F.3d 188, 216 (5th Cir. 2006); Pelphrey, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 1366 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
116
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Legal Brief System, http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/
briefs.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2007). Nine amicus briefs were filed in support of the
Appellant, Speaker Bosma, by the following advocates: the Liberty Counsel, the
Foundation for Moral Law, the Alliance Defense Fund, the Becket Fund, the Indiana Family
Institute, Theologians and Scholars (a group of twenty-one interested parties), the United
States Department of Justice, Advance America, and the National Legal Foundation. Id.
Two amicus briefs were filed in support of the Appellees by the Anti-Defamation League
and the American Jewish Congress. Id.
117
See, e.g., Mike Smith, Court Hears Fight on House Prayer: Appeal Result Could Have
Ripples, THE JOURNAL GAZETTE (Fort Wayne, Indiana), Sept. 8, 2006, at A1:
Bosma said [Judge] Kane [sic] told attorneys Thursday that the case
was ‘a surrogate for prayer in Congress’ and could apply to ‘every
state, local or national level of government that has prayer today.’ . . .
...
...
Bosma said he believes the case ultimately will be decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court.
Id.
118
Id. Further:
The ruling also prompted U.S. Rep. Mike Sodrel, R-Ind., to file a bill
that would bar federal judges from ruling on the content of prayer in
state legislatures. It is pending in a House committee, according to
Sodrel’s office.
A provision that would prohibit using federal funds to enforce
Hamilton’s ruling was amended into an appropriations bill that passed
the U.S. House and is now before the Senate.
Gail Gibson, GOP Lawmakers Take Aim at U.S. Judiciary, BALTIMORE SUN (Maryland), July 23,
2006, at A3. Oral Arguments were heard on September 7, 2006. Id.
119
H.R. Res. 1, 114th Gen. Ass., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2006). The first Indiana House
Resolution of 2006 was a reaction to the district court holding in Hindrichs urging the
Speaker to use his authority to exhaust all possible appeals of the district court’s order.
Among the Resolution’s declarations are support for the continuing history and tradition of
the invocation prayer, accompanied by the necessity of these prayers due to the demands
upon the Representatives:
Whereas, the members of the Indiana House of Representatives are
subject to the unique pressures and duties of their office and of the
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introduced measures in support of the Christian references by seeking to
cut off the jurisdiction of federal courts to hear the matter.120 The same

burdens of the legislative environment, which frequently requires that
they be absent from their own homes, families, and religious
congregations;
Whereas, the ministry of visiting clerics and the offering of invocations
accommodates the spiritual needs of the members of the Indiana
House of Representatives and facilitates the voluntary exercise of their
faith, providing them with spiritual encouragement while they are
away from their homes, families, and religious congregations;
Id. In addition, the Resolution admonishes the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana for its “restraint” on the “religious liberty and the freedom of
conscience and, . . . purports to control the specific content of prayers” in the “intolerable
order” forbidding the use of Christ’s name or communicates “the beliefs that Jesus of
Nazareth was the Christ, the Messiah, the Son of God, or the Savior, or that he was
resurrected, or that he will return on Judgment Day or is otherwise divine.” Id.
Confusingly, this plea for freedom of religious expression is followed by two
assertions that to eliminate these Christian references would be “inconsistent with the
settled beliefs and deepest convictions of many Hoosiers” and would, “because it attempts
to control the content of prayer . . . undermine[ ] the rights of all Hoosiers regardless of
their theological convictions.” Id.
Finally, the Resolution addresses the Supreme Court’s decision in Marsh, focusing
specifically on the opinion’s allowance of legislative prayer because of its historical practice
and explaining the legislature’s difficulty in accepting or applying the court order:
Whereas, as the United States Supreme Court’s decisions make clear,
public officials are not competent, in our constitutional order, to make
the fine theological distinctions and comparisons necessary for
one to declare that a prayer is sufficiently “inclusive” or
“nonsectarian” to satisfy the court’s injunction and the content of
prayer is a matter solely for the religious conscience of the cleric or
representative offering it.
Id. This is a puzzling assertion, since the Court’s holding in Marsh approved of the
methods used in the Nebraska Legislature and the parameters of prayer content therein.
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795.
The Resolution passed by a vote of eighty-five to zero, with fifteen members either
excused or abstaining. See H.R. 1, supra.
120
H.R. 4776, 109th Cong. (2006).
The bill introduced in the U.S. House of
Representatives by U.S. Rep. Sodrel, R-Ind., seeks to strip federal jurisdiction in cases such
as Hinrichs and is currently referred to the House Judiciary Committee. Id. The bill
provides for an amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1632 limiting jurisdiction as follows:
No court created by Act of Congress shall have any jurisdiction, and
the Supreme Court shall have no appellate jurisdiction, to hear or
decide any question pertaining to the interpretation or the validity,
under the Constitution, of the content of speech of any member of a
State legislative body or any individual invited by a State legislative
body to speak before that body, when such speech occurs during the
legislative session of that body.
H.R. 4776, 109th Cong. § 1 (2006). Such jurisdiction stripping legislative mechanisms have
been used in the past as a way to protest court rulings without success and this attempt
will likely face immediate challenge. See Gail Gibson, GOP Lawmakers Take Aim at U.S.
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Congressman also successfully introduced an amendment to an
appropriations bill in an effort to stop the allocation of any federal funds
in the enforcement of the final judgment of this case.121 With the Seventh
Circuit opinion pending, the Hinrichs case presents an opportunity for
the Supreme Court to readdress and clarify the allowable content of state
legislative prayer.122
2.

Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board: Extension of Marsh to the
Local Level

The Tangipahoa Parish case involving prayer at a School Board
meeting was recently decided by the Fifth Circuit.123 While the lawsuit
originally challenged prayer at school athletic events and prayers by
students over school public-address systems, as well as those at the
Judiciary, BALTIMORE SUN (Maryland), July 23, 2006, at A3. Duke University law professor
Erwin Chemerinsky, a constitutional law expert, noted that:
This has been proposed in Congress over and over again through
American history . . . In the 1950s, it was proposed with regard to the
loyalty oath cases. In the 1960s, it was the reapportionment cases, and
then the school prayer cases. In the 1980s, it was not letting federal
courts hear abortion cases or [school] busing cases. . . . I think that if
the effect is to preclude all federal jurisdiction over a specific issue,
that’s unconstitutional, and I think courts will say so. If Congress can
do this, then why couldn’t they pass a statute – imagine the most
blatantly unconstitutional law, persecuting a particular religious group
or racial minority – and then say, ‘No federal court, including the
Supreme Court, can review this.’ That can’t be right.
Id.
121
H. Amdt. 1164 (A068), 109th Cong. (2006) (amending H.R. 5672). The sole purpose of
this amendment to an appropriations bill for Science, the Department of State, Justice, and
Commerce, and related agencies, is the prohibition of using the funds “for the purpose of
enforcing the final judgment of the Federal District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana issued in Hinrichs v. Bosma.” Id.
122
See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 64, at 516. On the Bush Administration’s agenda,
the authors suggest:
One can . . . imagine a wide range of different possible directions for
Establishment Clause and Free Exercise doctrine, depending on
remaining opportunities for President Bush to make appointments
before his term expires in January 2009, the results of the 2006 elections
(which might shift control of the Senate or weaken the Republican
majority there), and, perhaps most importantly, the winner of the 2008
presidential election. It is worth noting, however, that a Democratic
appointment replacing Justice Stevens in 2009 would likely preserve
the current status quo that features Kennedy as the swing Justice,
while replacing Stevens with a strong conservative would have a much
more significant impact on the jurisprudence of the religion clauses
....
Id.
123
Tangipahoa Parish II, 477 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 2006).
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School Board meetings, the sole issue on appeal was the Board’s practice
of opening invocations.124 In October of 2003, John Doe, an anonymous
resident and taxpayer of Tangipahoa Parish and the father of two sons
who attended high school in the Parish School System, filed an action for
himself and his sons seeking to declare the School Board’s prayer
practice an Establishment Clause violation and enjoin the School Board
from continuing its practice.125
Ten months later and, obviously, with full knowledge of the Does’
objections to the prayers, the Board considered the adoption of a policy
which would limit the prayer-giving responsibilities to board members
and require the invocations to be non-sectarian and non-proselytizing.126
This policy, however, was unanimously rejected by the School Board.127
The prayers are considered a local tradition, though their thirty-year
history hardly compares to the 188-year-old tradition of the Indiana
House of Representatives.128 Each meeting began with a prayer,
124
Id. at 192. All other prayer practices were resolved by an August 2004 judgment
which enjoined the other prayer events, except for prayers given by students at graduation
ceremonies. Id. Two contempt motions were dismissed relating to incidents where a
teacher’s aide and a substitute announcer at a baseball game violated the orders prohibiting
the various other prayer practices. Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd. (Tangipahoa Parish
III), 2005 WL 901127 at *1 (E.D. La. 2005). The prayers often contained specific references to
“God[,]” “Heavenly Father[,]” and “Jesus[.]” Id. The parties stipulated to the content of
four specific prayers which had been delivered at School Board meetings between February
2003 and June 2004. Id.
125
Tangipahoa Parish I, 2005 WL 517341 at *1. The ACLU has commended the courage of
the plaintiffs in Tangipahoa Parish for coming forward, albeit anonymously, to challenge
the School Board’s repeated attempts to promote Christianity in the public schools. Debra
Lemoine, Judge Gets Arguments on School Board Meeting Prayers, BATON ROUGE ADVOC.,
Sept. 10, 2004, at 1.
126
Tangipahoa Parish II, 477 F.3d at 194. The policy had been prepared and recommended
to the School Board by the New Orleans law firm hired by the school’s insurance company.
Alan Sayre, Tangipahoa Schools to Drop Prayers Before Ballgames, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Aug.
25, 2004, at 5.
127
Tangipahoa Parish II, 477 F.3d at 194. The powerful influence of conservative
Christians in the locality has rallied to support religious activities in the public schools. See
Debra Lemoine, Judge Gets Arguments on School Board Meeting Prayers, BATON ROUGE
ADVOC., at 1 (quoting the athiest plaintiff in the evolution disclaimer lawsuit, “[t]hey want
to involve the church in the school . . . If they hadn’t done it on a systematic basis, people
like me wouldn’t have said anything.”).
128
Compare Mellen, 327 F.3d 355, 370 (4th Cir. 2003) (declining to hold that the supper
prayer at Virginia Military Institute shares the “unique history” of state legislative prayer
because “public universities and military colleges, such as VMI, did not exist when the Bill
of Rights was adopted”), with Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 667 (Breyer, J., concurring)
(determining that the passage of forty years without any legal objection raised and as part
of a broader moral and historical display strongly suggest that the granite Ten
Commandments on the Statehouse grounds did not violate the Establishment Clause by
promoting religion).
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followed by recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance.129 The prayers were
offered by a variety of speakers, ranging from board members and
superintendents, as well as teachers, students, and ministers.130
Questions of constitutionality were raised concerning both the prayer
content and the classification of the board meetings as a legislative
body.131
Four particular prayers offered between January 2002 and August
2004 were singled out in the case’s stipulations and called into
question.132 All four prayers were overtly Christian.133 The three-judge
129
Tangipahoa Parish II, 477 F.3d at 192. The School Board meetings are open to the public
and students are welcome to attend. Id. In fact, of the sampling of thirty-one prayers
delivered between January 2002 and August 2004, nine were given by students or former
students. Id.
130
Id. The four prayers singled out were delivered by the School System’s assistant
superintendent, a Board member’s son, an elementary school principal, and a Board
member, respectively. Id.
131
See generally Tangipahoa Parish II, 477 F.3d 188. The first prayer from the parties’
stipulations contained the following:
Heavenly Father, we thank you for the many blessings we’ve
received. . . . [W]e thank you for the greatest gift of all – your darling
son, Jesus Christ. For we all know that He was born, died, and rose
again, so that we all may be forgiven for our sins. . . . These things we
ask in your darling son, Jesus Christ’s[,] name. Amen.
Id. at 192.
132
Id. at 192-93. The second prayer stipulated ended with the closing, “Grant our
supplications, we beseech Thee, through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen.” Id. at 193. The
third stipulated prayer opened with, “Heavenly Father, we thank you for all the blessings
that you have given us,” and closed with, “we ask all of these things through Your Son,
Jesus Christ. Amen.” Id. The final stipulated prayer simply began with reference to
“Father.” Id.
133
Id. at 192-93. The prayers’ references to “Jesus Christ” and God as “Heavenly Father”
are all that is necessary to make the prayers nonsectarian. See G. Sidney Buchanan, Prayer
in Governmental Institutions: The Who, the What, and the At Which Level, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 299,
351 (2001) (suggesting as a bright-line rule that “References to ‘God,’ ‘Heavenly Father (or
Mother),’ ‘Divine Being,’ ‘Ruler of the Universe,’ etc. are okay, but references to Jesus
Christ, Muhammad, Buddha, etc. are not okay.”). The School Board’s refusal to adopt the
Marsh-appropriate policy limiting the content of the prayers to non-sectarian, nonproselytizing language was irrelevant when the case was decided by the District Court
because the lower court did not find the School Board to be a legislative body, and thus
applied the Lemon test to hold that the practice at its core violated the Establishment
Clause. Tangipahoa Parish I, 2005 WL 517341 at *9. The district court followed Coles v.
Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1999), in its determination of a school board as
an integral part of a public school system, thus evaluating the prayer practice as those in
school environments. Tangipahoa Parish I, 2005 WL 517341 at *6. The district court also
noted that other cases outside the public school setting have been unwilling to extend
Marsh beyond its unique legislative setting. Id. at *9 (citing North Carolina Civil Liberties
Union Legal Found. v. Constangy, 947 F.2d 1145, 1147 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that judicial
prayer at the beginning of court sessions did not fall within the Marsh exception)).
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panel of the Circuit Court gave three inconsistent opinions regarding
both the appropriateness of the prayer content, and notably, the
designation of the School Board meeting as a legislative or deliberative
body.134
The three judges adopted three different analyses. One followed the
Marsh/Allegheny doctrine, and after assuming that the School Board was
a deliberative legislative body which fell under the legislative prayer
exception, held that the four prayers in question were decidedly
Christian in content and were impermissible.135 The second opinion
followed the district court’s reasoning, refusing to classify the School
Board as a legislative body and, applying Lemon, ruled that the prayer
practice violated the Establishment Clause.136
The third opinion

See generally Tangipahoa Parish II, 477 F.3d 188.
Id. at 202. The reasoning is as follows:
For the Board’s prayers to fall outside those permitted by Marsh, we
must conclude either: (1) the Board, although stipulated to be a
deliberative body, does not fit within Marsh’s description of legislative
and other deliberative public bodies either because Marsh did not
intend to encompass any entities beyond legislatures or because the
prayers fit within the public-school context to which Marsh does not
apply; or (2) the prayers are not nonsectarian and non-proselytizing, in
violation of Marsh and subsequent guidance from the Court. Because
the overtly sectarian prayers included in the stipulations fall outside
Marsh’s limited reach, we need not decide: (1) whether the Board fits
within Marsh’s legislative scope; and (2) thus whether other prayers
might be constitutionally permissible. This is in keeping with the longstanding and extremely sensible rule that constitutional issues should
be decided on the most narrow, limited basis.
Id. (internal quotes and citations omitted).
136
Id. at 212. Adult environment prayer cases have explored both government
endorsement of prayer through the Lemon test as well as subtle coercion. Compare Coles,
171 F.3d at 385-86 (concluding through use of the Lemon test that school board’s prayer
practice conveys a message of government endorsement of religion in the public school
system), with Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d 982, 986 (7th Cir. 1997) (applying the Lemon test to
university commencement prayer and holding that such non-denominational invocation
does not convey a message of government endorsement of religion). Compare Mellen, 327
F.3d at 370-71 (applying the Lemon test to supper prayer practice at the Virginia Military
Institute, with special consideration given to coercive principles to hold prayers violated
Establishment Clause), with Chaudhuri v. State of Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232, 238-39 (6th Cir.
1997) (holding that a professor at a state university was not obligated to attend university
events where non-sectarian prayers were delivered, thus Lee’s subtle coercion did not
apply), and Tanford, 104 F.3d at 985-96 (declining to find coercion in the adult university
commencement environment where students and professors are free to ignore prayers).
134
135
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accepted the School board as a deliberative body worthy of the Marsh
exception, and declined to find the Christian content objectionable.137
Like the Hinrichs case, the Tangipahoa Parish case has sparked a slew
of controversy in its locality.138 Taxpayers in Tangipahoa Parish accrued
litigation costs of over $100,000 in seeking the Fifth Circuit appeal.139
With the litigation spanning over three years, and the possibility of a
further appeal by the School Board, the discord in Tangipahoa Parish
continues.140 Additionally, like in Indiana, local politicians have latched
onto this issue in state and national politics in an attempt to support the

137
Compare Tangipahoa Parish II, 477 F.3d at 211-17 (Clement, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (holding that Marsh applies to the School Board as a deliberative body,
but that even if the prayers at the meetings were uniformly Christian, the record lacks
“evidence that the Board advances Christianity to the exclusion of another sect or creed”),
with Pelphrey, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 1348 (holding that the Cobb County Commission did not
show an “impermissible governmental preference for one religious perspective.”).
138
See Jenny Hurwitz, Student-Teacher Settles Lawsuit Against SLU: She was Flunked After
Objecting to Prayers, NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, Oct. 5, 2006, at 1:
A student-teacher who claimed she was given a failing grade by
Southeastern Louisiana University because she objected to teacher-led
prayer in a Ponchatoula classroom has settled a lawsuit she filed
against the university.
....
In early 2005, Thompson was assigned to the public D.C. Reeves
Elementary School in Ponchatoula as part of her student-teacher
training. Over the next few months, she observed teacher Pamela
Sullivan lead her class in prayer and organize a Bible study group on
school grounds on several occasions.
The Tangipahoa Parish School Board, which also served as defendant
in the case, later investigated Sullivan, verified the allegations, and
ultimately halted such practices . . .
An honor student who made the dean’s list at Southeastern,
Thompson alleged the university gave her a failing grade because she
reported the prayer activities.
Id.
139
David J. Mitchell, School Board Spent $100,900 on Prayer Fight, BATON ROUGE ADVOC.,
Nov. 12, 2006, at B3. Of that amount, almost $85,000 will not be reimbursed by the School
Board’s insurer and will be out of pocket expenses. Id.
140
David J. Mitchell, Understanding Key to Debate on Board Prayer, BATON ROUGE ADVOC.,
Jan. 9, 2007, at B7 (“The board is expected to consider whether to seek a rehearing by the
entire appeals court – having until Jan. 19 to file – but one wonders whether more litigation
by either side would produce a much different result.”); see also Appeals Court Finds
Louisiana School Board Improperly Engaged in Sectarian Prayer During Meetings, U.S. FED.
NEWS, Dec. 16, 2006 (quoting Joe Cook, Executive Director of the ACLU of Louisiana,
“Because the court did not rule on the issue most central to the case, the ACLU and its
clients are considering whether to request rehearing or appeal. . . . We believe the court
needs to squarely face the questions presented and make a clear cut decision.”).
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validity of the Christian agenda.141
These measures concerning
legislative prayer are just part of a larger national agenda addressing
other Establishment Clause issues.142
These two cases, Hinrichs and Tangipahoa Parish, exemplify the
problems arising in legislative prayer doctrine.143 Speaker Bosma is
attempting to expand the Marsh ruling to allow the use of blatantly
Christian, arguably proselytizing prayer content.144 The Fifth Circuit’s
three-judge panel failed to agree on whether the School Board is a
legislative body under Marsh and the sectarian nature of the prayers.145
With the Marsh decision leaving uncertainties as to the limits of prayer
content allowed and the deliberative bodies to which it applies, courts
are struggling to decide the cases before them that argue for the

See Briefing Book: News and Views from the Louisiana Capitol, NEW ORLEANS TIMES
PICAYUNE, June 17, 2005 at 4:
Siding with the Tangipahoa Parish School Board in a fight with the
American Civil Liberties Union, a Senate panel approved a resolution
Thursday that would express the support of the Legislature for prayer
at school board meetings. House Concurrent Resolution 39 by Rep.
A.G. Crowe, R-Slidell, says prayer is protected and follows the
principles on which the United States was founded. It says the
Legislature disapproves of a federal judge’s decision that prayers are
unconstitutional at school board meetings. The Senate Education
Committee approved the resolution without objection or much
discussion. Already approved by the House, it goes next to the full
Senate for debate. If approved there, it would express the will of the
Legislature. It does not go to the governor’s desk for action.
Id.
142
In announcing the American Values Agenda legislative package, Speaker of the
House J. Dennis Hastert (R-IL) issued the following statement:
The American Values Agenda will defend America’s founding
principles. Through this agenda, we will work to protect the faith of
our people, the sanctity of life and freedoms outlined by our founding
fathers. Radical courts have attempted to gut our religious freedom
and redefine the value system on which America was built. We hope
to restore some of those basic values through passing this legislative
agenda and renewing our country’s commitment to faith, freedom and
life.
Media Release from J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House, http://speaker.house.gov/
library/misc/060627americanvalues.shtml.
Included in the legislative agenda are
proposed acts “protecting” the Pledge of Allegiance, the display of the American flag,
public prayer, heterosexual marriage, unborn children, embryos (e.g. stem cells), and gun
ownership rights. Id.
143
See supra Part II.C (describing events surrounding the two highlighted cases).
144
See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing the appeal of the challenge to prayers offered in the
Indiana Legislature).
145
See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the lack of agreement in the decision from the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals.)
141
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application of the legislative prayer exception and legislative entities are
wasting time and money arguing what could be a settled issue.146
III. TESTING THE LIMITS OF MARSH
The Establishment Clause generally limits the interaction between
government and religion.147 In the context of legislative prayer,
governmental deliberative bodies lack guidelines as to what prayers can
be offered and where.148 Recent cases are testing the constitutional limits
of legislative prayer content and deliberative bodies to which the
legislative prayer exception may be applied.149 The behavior in the
Indiana House of Representatives, including the refusal to continue the
prayer practice rather than follow the guidelines of the court injunction,
may signal a shift in the political atmosphere concerning legislative
prayer.150 Likewise, the refusal of the Tangipahoa Parish School Board to
adopt the most commonly accepted interpretation of Marsh in its prayer
practice indicates the School Board’s belief that it fits within the
legislative prayer exception and can invoke sectarian prayers to open its
meetings.151 In the first instance, prayer-givers are challenging the
allowable content or language used in legislative prayers.152 In the
second, governmental entities are expanding the breadth of deliberative
bodies to which the Marsh exception applies.153 Ambiguities exist
concerning both of these limiting factors, and these areas of uncertainty
are allowing those with a religious agenda to blur the limits on prayer
content and applicable deliberative bodies.154

146
See infra Part III (analyzing the Establishment Clause doctrines available and their
application to legislative prayer).
147
See supra Part II.A (discussing the history of legislative prayer, including its use by the
First Congress).
148
See supra Part II.B (discussing the application of Marsh/Allegheny to legislative prayer
and the application of other Establishment Clause judicial doctrines in non-legislative,
adult prayer situations).
149
See supra Part II.C (discussing the two current cases which highlight the content and
deliberative body parameters which this Note suggests require clarification).
150
See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing the controversy surrounding the prayers in the
Indiana Legislature).
151
See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the controversy surrounding the prayers offered at the
Tangipahoa Parish School Board meetings).
152
See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing Hinrichs).
153
See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing Tangipahoa Parish).
154
See infra Parts III.A, III.B (analyzing the limits of the Marsh/Allegheny doctrine).
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A. The Marsh/Allegheny Doctrine Does Not Permit Sectarian Prayer
Content
Because Marsh is the only Supreme Court decision addressing
legislative prayer, a clarification of the Court’s specific holdings is
necessary.155 First, based on the nation’s history and tradition, which
allow for legislative prayer, the Marsh opinion identifies the dominance
of the Judeo-Christian tradition.156 This tradition, as offered by the
chaplain from Nebraska who demonstrated sensitivity toward offending
any religious minorities, was acceptable.157 In addition, both paying the
chaplain and allowing a chaplain long-term tenure are within
constitutional limits.158 The Court approved of the sixteen year term of
the Nebraska clergyman because his reappointment was not found to
come from any “impermissible motive.”159
Another important
conclusion of Marsh, the constitutionality of legislative prayer itself, is
straightforward and clear.160 The Marsh majority reached this conclusion
155
See supra Part II (discussing the history of legislative prayer and its development in
case law since Marsh).
156
See supra text accompanying note 39. But see Steven G. Gey, More or Less Bunk: The
Establishment Clause Answers that History Doesn’t Provide, 2004 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1617, 1631
(2004) (rejecting the idea that the United States is a Protestant nation, a Christian nation, or
even a uniformly religious nation).
157
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793-94. Note again, however, that the opinion deliberately avoided
dissecting the prayers’ content where there is not discernible motive shown for the practice
to attempt to proselytize. Id. at 794.
158
See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
159
See Marsh 463 U.S. at 793-94. But see Marsh, 483 U.S. at 822-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting):
In a democratically elected legislature, the religious beliefs of the
chaplain tend to reflect the faith of the majority of the lawmakers’
constituents. Prayers may be said by a Catholic priest in the
Massachusetts Legislature and by a Presbyterian minister in the
Nebraska Legislature, but I would not expect to find a Jehovah’s
Witness or a disciple of Mary Baker Eddy or the Reverend Moon
serving as the official chaplain in any state legislature. Regardless of
the motivation of the majority that exercises the power to appoint the
chaplain, it seems plain to me that the designation of a member of one
religious faith to serve as the sole official chaplain of a state legislature
for a period of 16 years constitutes the preference of one faith over
another in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.
Id.
160
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792; see also note 35 and accompanying text. The nation’s historical
practice of legislative prayer, as well as Nebraska’s own century-long tradition, weighed
heavily in favor of carving out an Establishment Clause exception for the practice:
In light of the unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200
years, there can be no doubt that the practice of opening legislative
sessions with prayer has become part of the fabric of our society. To
invoke Divine guidance on a public body entrusted with making the
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without applying any of the usual Establishment Clause analyses
because the practice could not pass these tests.161 Due to this historicallybased, conclusive holding, almost all subsequent legislative prayer case
opinions have leapt past the question of whether an opening prayer
offered at a governmental deliberative body meeting is, in and of itself, a
violation of the Establishment Clause.162
But the Marsh decision did not grant governments a free pass to pray
indiscriminately; it provided a clear delineation of who could pray and
acknowledged acceptable content.163 Some constitutional limits to
content have been discerned from the Court’s holding.164 The Court
recognized that the dominance of Judeo-Christian influence greatly
affects the actual content of the prayers, but no limits for this dominant
theology were further defined.165 The second significant observation of
the Court was that prayers which do not clearly proselytize, advance, or
disparage any one faith will not be dissected because such an evaluation
by a court would prove difficult.166 Marsh fails to define proselytizing,
advancing, or disparaging any faith, leaving courts and responsible
legislators attempting to adhere to the Court’s holding in Marsh without
a bright line rule on allowable content.167

laws is not, in these circumstances, an “establishment” of religion or a
step toward establishment; it is simply a tolerable acknowledgment of
beliefs widely held among the people of this country.
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792.
161
See supra note 35 (detailing the Supreme Court’s choice not to apply the Lemon test or
the endorsement test).
162
See supra Part II.B.1 (describing the decisions in legislative prayer cases since the Marsh
decision).
163
See supra note 43 and accompanying text (quoting the Allegheny decision’s reference to
the Marsh holding).
164
See supra text accompanying note 39 (discussing the lack of necessity to address the
content in Marsh because the prayers in question were not proselytizing).
165
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793. There is only one mention in the opinion of the JudeoChristian tradition in which the prayers in the Nebraska Legislature are offered, but a
footnote to the simple acknowledgement may give some insight: “[The chaplain]
characterizes his prayers as ‘nonsectarian,’ ‘Judeo Christian,’ and with ‘elements of the
American civil religion. . . . Although some of his earlier prayers were often explicitly
Christian, [he] removed all references to Christ after a 1980 complaint from a Jewish
legislator.” Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793 n.14 (citations omitted).
166
See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795 (“[I]t is not for us to embark on a sensitive evaluation or to
parse the content of a particular prayer.”).
167
See, e.g., Pelphrey, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 1330; Wynne, 376 F.3d 292. But see supra note 116
(describing Speaker Bosma’s refusal to censor prayers of prayer-givers).
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B. Marsh Exception Limited to State Legislative Prayer Practice
The Supreme Court’s conclusive finding that state legislative prayer
is within Establishment Clause bounds due to the history and tradition
of such prayer has been interpreted broadly.168 Courts apply Marsh in
case after case as a blanket exception, allowing prayer by local
governmental entities.169 But the Marsh opinion can also be narrowly
read to apply only to state legislatures, thus creating the confusion
apparent in Tangipahoa Parish.170
Legislative prayer takes place in an almost exclusively adult
environment which results in constitutional analysis much different than
other public prayer cases.171 Yet the adult environment of legislative
prayer does not follow the analysis of other adult-implicated
Establishment Clause doctrines, otherwise the results would be vastly
different.172
Courts frequently use the Lemon test to decide Establishment Clause
cases, including adult prayer situations.173 Applying the test’s three
prongs to any legislative prayer challenge would quickly determine the
prayers to be unconstitutional.174 The first prong of Lemon requires the
court to determine whether the government action has a secular
purpose.175 Marsh discussed how the practice quieted down the
legislative members and signaled the opening of business, but this
168
See Marsh, 463 U.S. 783 (describing the historical tradition of paid legislative
chaplains).
169
See supra Part II.B.1.
170
See supra notes 135-37 (detailing the three opinions published by the three-judge panel
of the Fifth Circuit).
171
See Tangipahoa Parish I, 2005 WL 517341 at *9; Tangipahoa Parish II, 477 F.3d at 211. But
see Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (establishing the coercion test through the finding
that prayers at public school graduations are inherently coercive because there is great
pressure on students to attend their graduation ceremonies and to not leave during the
prayer).
172
See supra note 35. See, e.g., Ashley M. Bell, “God Save This Honorable Court”: How
Current Establishment Clause Jurisprudence Can Be Reconciled With the Secularization of
Historical Religious Expressions, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1273, 1320 (2001) (concluding that many
historical religious expressions used in government would be deemed unconstitutional
under the regular Establishment Clause tests).
173
See, e.g., supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing use of Lemon test to evaluate
adult prayer in Coles).
174
See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 800-01 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“In sum, I have no doubt that, if
any group of law students were asked to apply the principles of Lemon to the question of
legislative prayer, they would nearly unanimously find the practice to be
unconstitutional.”).
175
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
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notion was dismissed because there are many other available methods of
calling a body to order.176 Second, Lemon requires the court to consider
whether the principal or primary effect of the government action either
advances or inhibits religion.177 Spending taxpayer funds in an effort to
finance a regular practice, which repeatedly puts forth a Judeo-Christian
belief system, clearly advances religion.178 Finally, under Lemon the court
must ascertain whether the government action causes excessive
entanglement with religion.179 Funding of the prayer practice as well as
monitoring or overseeing the practice, for example, qualify as
government entanglement with religion.180 Simply put, due to the fact
that legislative prayer cannot survive the Lemon test, another test is
needed in order to control the historical prayer practice.181
The coercion test is a reflection of the accommodation theory of the
Establishment Clause, whereby the government only violates the clause
if it coerces religious participation.182 Predicting its application to
legislative prayer is difficult because there is not one accepted standard
for what constitutes coercion.183
A strong contingent of
accommodationists believe that coercion only exists where there is actual
coercion of religious orthodoxy and of financial support by force of law
and threat of penalty.184 The idea of subtle coercion recognizes that
feelings of isolation and discomfort in situations where there is social
pressure to attend and witness prayer can constitute government
176
See supra note 111 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing the secular purposes offered for
opening prayers in the Nebraska Legislature).
177
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
178
See, e.g., Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228, 234 (8th Cir. 1982) (“The primary effect of
the practice as a whole is unmistakably to advance religion and to give preference to one
religious view. The state has placed its official seal of approval on one religious view for
sixteen years and has stood behind that seal with its funds. . .”).
179
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
180
Marsh, 483 U.S. at 798-99 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
181
See supra note 174. In fact, the first point made in Marsh acknowledged that the lower
court had applied the Lemon test resulting in the prayer practice failing all three prongs.
Marsh, 483 U.S. at 786 (“Applying the three-part test . . . the court held that the chaplaincy
practice violated all three elements of the test. . . .”).
182
See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 577 (establishing the coercion test through the finding that
prayers at public school graduations are inherently coercive because there is great pressure
on students to attend their graduation ceremonies and to not leave during the prayer).
183
Compare Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (finding a coercive environment at public middle and
high school graduation ceremonies that include prayer); with Mellen, 327 F.3d 355
(discussing the coercive environment at a military college with supper prayer practice).
184
Weisman, 505 U.S. at 631 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Establishment Clause must be
construed in light of the government policies of accommodation, acknowledgment, and
support for religion [that] are an accepted part of our political and cultural heritage.”)
(internal citation omitted).
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coercion to participate in religious activity.185 This Note suggests that the
subtle coercion theory is applicable to local legislative and deliberative
bodies’ prayer practices.186
While not a singular Establishment Clause doctrine, the huge
deference to history and tradition is an important consideration in
attempting to clarify the outcome of legislative prayer cases.187 Some
argue that allowing government to accommodate religion due to
tradition inevitably leads to subtle favoritism for religious majorities
and, unfortunately, subtle disapproval towards religious minorities.188
Despite such concerns, a heavy reliance on deference to history and
tradition begs the question: How long must a practice exist to be
deemed traditional?189 Surely the 188-year tradition of an opening
invocation at the Indiana House of Representatives is long enough to
sway a judge.190 But what of the Tangipahoa Parish School Board’s
thirty-three year old practice?
Legislative bodies would be better able to solemnize appropriate
occasions with prayer while avoiding conflict with a clarification of the
current legislative prayer doctrine.191 The Marsh holding fails to give
consistent guidance, as demonstrated by the recent ambiguities that have
arisen in recent lower court cases.192 Taking advantage of these
ambiguities, some political groups are pushing to expand the mix of
Christian beliefs into governmental functions.193 Part IV of this Note
proposes a refining of the legislative prayer doctrine of Marsh,
suggesting a clearer directive regarding the allowable content of

See id.
See infra Part IV (suggesting a two-pronged judicial doctrine mandating all prayer
content be nonsectarian and a narrowing of the Marsh/Allegheny application to only large,
impersonal legislative sessions).
187
See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 783.
188
See id.
189
See supra note 38 (discussing the recent Supreme Court decision in Van Orden v. Perry
swinging on Justice Brennan’s heavy reliance tradition in allowing the continuous and
unchallenged display of the Ten Commandments outside of the Texas Statehouse for over
forty years to remain).
190
See, e.g., Marsh, 463 U.S. at 784.
191
See generally supra Part III (discussing the limits of the application of Marsh).
192
See, e.g., supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s
decision in Tangipahoa Parish, which generated three opinions from the three-judge panel).
193
See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative reaction to
Hinrichs); see also supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative
reaction to Tangipahoa Parish and the announcement of the American Values Agenda).
185
186
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government prayers and restricting the application of Marsh to state
legislative bodies.194
IV. CLEAR LIMITS FOR LEGISLATIVE PRAYER
It is necessary to resolve the uncertainties in the application of Marsh
to deliberative body prayer practices for several basic policy reasons.
First, the cases that arise from the ambiguity waste time and money.195
Second, these cases are simply divisive.196 Those in the minority are
made to feel excluded, and worse, often harassed when challenging the
majority.197 Hinrichs, a lobbyist, lost his job as a result of pursuing his
case against the Indiana prayer practice.198 In the aftermath of the Does’
complaint, a student teacher in the Tangipahoa Parish School system
who reported prayer activities in the school was given a failing grade.199
Such discord resulting from religious diversity is exactly what the
Establishment Clause was meant to avoid.200
With the presidential and legislative political trends of the past
decade, the agenda of the conservative, religious electorate has been
brought to the forefront of government policy.201 These aspirations have
a natural consequence of bringing about a spate of cases involving the
Religion Clauses.202 Since Marsh, all of the challenges brought regarding
legislative prayer, until Hinrichs, have arisen from local government
actions.203 These challenges were decided using Marsh as the model.204
With Hinrichs, the limited holding in Marsh resulted in confusion and
controversy with state-level legislative prayer content.205 Tangipahoa
Parish underscores the question of the breadth of the legislative prayer

See infra Part IV.A.
See, e.g., supra notes 118-121 (discussing legislative reactions to Hinrichs); supra notes
139-40 (discussing costs of the legal battle in Tangipahoa Parish).
196
See, e.g., supra notes 125-27 (discussing the ongoing controversies for the past decade
over prayer in Tangipahoa Parish).
197
See Engel, 370 U.S. at 431 (“When the power, prestige and financial support of
government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure
upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is
plain.”).
198
See supra note 106.
199
See supra note 138.
200
See supra Part II.A (discussing the Establishment Clause’s adoption by the First
Congress).
201
See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 64, at 515-16.
202
See id. at 516.
203
See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing legislative prayer decisions).
204
See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing application of the Marsh/Allegheny doctrine).
205
See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing the Hinrichs case).
194
195
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exception, whether it includes deliberative bodies other than a state
legislature.206
Hinrichs and Tangipahoa Parish signal that the
jurisprudence of Marsh has reached its practical limits.207
A. Model Judicial Reasoning for Legislative Prayer
The first prong of this proposed legislative prayer doctrine would
simply regard any sectarian prayers to be unconstitutional. A case by
case determination of whether prayer content qualifies as proselytizing
is too difficult when dealing with a written record rather than actually
witnessing the invocation’s delivery.208 Moreover, all subjectivity would
be eliminated as to when content crosses the line into proselytizing by
simply concentrating on the sectarian notion. No threat of proselyzation
exists if prayers remain completely non-sectarian.209
The second prong of this proposed legislative prayer doctrine is that
the state legislative model should not be extended to apply to lower level
legislative bodies. The decision in Marsh was specific to a state
legislature, and this proposal would limit its application accordingly.
Marsh is based on the specific facts of the prayer practice in the Nebraska
legislature, including: the unique history of prayer in state legislative
bodies; the large size of such groups; and the allowance of individuals
coming and going throughout the session.210 Local government entities
and deliberative bodies, therefore, should receive a different analysis.211
The tests applied to other adult prayer situations, the Lemon test and the
theory of subtle coercion, would be more appropriately applied to prayer
offered at local legislative meetings akin to school board, town hall, or
county council meetings.212
B. Commentary on the Application of Proposed Limits to Legislative Prayer
Application of the first prong, strictly limiting prayer to nonsectarian
content, is simple and straightforward. Invocations to a divine being,

See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the Tangipahoa Parish case).
See supra Parts II.C.1, II.C.2 (discussing the Hinrichs and Tangipahoa Parish cases).
208
See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing cases decided using Marsh/Allegheny content analysis
and their subsequent inconsistencies).
209
See supra Part III.A (discussing content limitations of Marsh/Allegheny doctrine).
210
See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text (discussing Marsh holding).
211
See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the constitutional evaluation of adult prayer
situations).
212
See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the constitutional evaluation of adult prayer
situations).
206
207
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without reference to a specific religion, would be permitted.213 In most
situations, courts deciding controversies and, usually, the legislative
bodies themselves, are already following the spirit of Marsh/Allegheny by
avoiding even specifically Christian references.214 Rare are the renegades
who focus in on the dicta of Marsh which suggests an aversion to parsing
the language of prayers and attempt to impose sectarian prayers when
government is the speaker.215 However, a Supreme Court decision
elevating the spirit of nonsectarian prayer from Marsh into a clear
constitutional command would relieve our legislatures, and
subsequently, our courtrooms, of the debate over content.216
While the Lemon test is the standard Establishment Clause judicial
doctrine, it is often difficult to apply to legislative prayer and would
almost uniformly reject such practice as unconstitutional.217 The
consideration of historical tradition is reasonable, but no clear
parameters exist defining just how long a time period justifies a prayer
practice.218 However, the theory of subtle coercion can be applied to
legislative prayer situations involving local legislative bodies.219
Although the citizens attending such meetings are generally adults as
opposed to the primary and secondary students involved in the
doctrine’s inception, the role of citizens attending local government
meetings differs greatly from the usual adult prayer case contexts.220
Unlike attendance at a public university graduation, where all attendees
are unified in celebration, the reality of attendance at a local government
meeting usually includes the existence of an adversarial or supplicant

See supra text accompanying notes 54-56 (giving a summation of how references to
Christ advance one particular faith).
214
See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the application of Marsh/Allegheny in legislative
prayer cases).
215
See, e.g., supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text (discussing Pelphrey); Part II.C.1
(discussing the facts of Hinrichs).
216
Currently the Seventh Circuit decision in Hinrichs is pending, while the School Board
of Tangipahoa Parish is seeking further appeal. See supra Part II.C.
217
See supra notes 173-81 and accompanying text (analyzing application of the Lemon test
to legislative prayer).
218
See supra notes 187-90 and accompanying text (discussing consideration of history and
tradition in Establishment Clause decisions).
219
See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text (discussing application of subtle coercion
in Mellen); see also supra notes 182-86 and accompanying text (analyzing use of coercion test
and recognizing the feelings of discomfort, isolation, and social pressure to participate in
certain government prayer activities).
220
See, e.g., supra note 80-83 and accompanying text (discussing the use of prayer at a
school board meeting); supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text (discussing the
attendance at the Tangipahoa Parish school board meetings).
213
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relationship.221 Furthermore, unlike at the state or national legislative
levels where the average citizen is only present for an opening
invocation in a singular or sporadic observance of his government or as a
function of employment, at the local level a citizen is usually present at a
government meeting to accomplish a goal.222 This difference in purpose
creates a difference in the effect of the prayer on those attending,
magnifying feelings of isolation and discouraging participation from a
citizen who is a religious minority.223 Simply narrowing the Marsh
legislative prayer exception to apply only to state legislatures, and not to
lower government deliberative bodies, would spare those who practice
faiths outside the Christian majority from remaining religiously
segregated and allow those citizens to feel fully involved in their local
government.224
V. CONCLUSION
We look forward to the day when all nations and all
people of the earth will have the opportunity to hear and
respond to messages of love of the Almighty God who has
revealed Himself in the saving power of Jesus Christ.225
A Supreme Court decision in either Hinrichs or Tangipahoa Parish
would clarify the boundaries of permissible legislative prayer. In fact,
the two cases decided in tandem could solve both of the ambiguities of
the Marsh doctrine identified in this Note. The judicial reasoning
proposed in Part IV provides a method by which a court may resolve
both cases in a just manner.

221
Compare supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text (discussing prayer at university
functions in Tanford and Chaudhuri); with supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text
(discussing prayer at local school board meeting in Coles).
222
Compare supra Part II.A (discussing the history of legislative prayer up to and
including the Marsh/Allegheny decisions); with supra Part II.B.2 (discussing adult prayer in
non-legislative situations).
223
See supra Part III.B (discussing the evaluation of adult prayer through alternative
methods, including the coercion test).
224
See supra Part III.B (discussing the evaluation of adult prayer through alternative
methods, including the coercion test).
225
Hinrichs, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 1107 (quoting opening prayer asking for worldwide
conversion to Christianity from March 28, 2005). While arguably proselytizing as
delivered, this prayer would be acceptable in the Indiana House of Representatives with
only the reference to “Almighty God,” but fails the suggested test due to the phrase which
follows this supreme deity reference, which makes the prayer clearly Christian and
sectarian.
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By applying the bright-line rule of allowing only non-sectarian
prayer, the District Court decision in Hinrichs v. Bosma would be
affirmed.
Any and all references to Christianity would remain
forbidden, just as the current injunction dictates. The Speaker would be
forced to carry on with the business of legislating for the state, rather
than spending time and money to assert Christian religious beliefs that
the vast majority of Hoosiers adhere to already.
Recognizing that the Marsh prayer exception was intended to apply
narrowly to state legislatures and that the dynamic is drastically
different at local government levels, the District Court decision in Doe v.
Tangipahoa Parish School Board would also be affirmed. Whether through
application of the Lemon test or the theory that subtle coercion exists at
local government meetings, the thirty-three years of government prayer
at the School Board meetings would come to a permanent halt. The
residents of Tangipahoa Parish would be able to put their tax dollars to
work educating their children, rather than defending the religious
practice that they are free to carry out in private.
Future disputes involving legislative prayer would simply pass
Establishment Clause muster if the legislative body is at the state or
national level, and the prayer’s content is non-sectarian. Just as Justice
Brennan’s dissent in Marsh mused that any law student would find
legislative prayer to fail the Lemon test, this two-pronged test would
easily identify allowable legislative prayer. Such a clear test would
eliminate the bounty of cases and controversies arising in this branch of
constitutional jurisprudence.
The Christian majority needs this
clarification; that what it deems “just a little talk with Jesus” is a
violation of the First Amendment whenever government is the speaker.
Anne Abrell226
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